Troy Hopkins v. Nancy Berryhill

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
SEP 28 2017
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TROY HOPKINS, No. 15-56273
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 5:14-cv-00657-DFM
v.
MEMORANDUM*
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Douglas F. McCormick, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 26, 2017**
Before: CLIFTON, N.R. SMITH, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Troy Hopkins appeals pro se the district court’s decision affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of Hopkins’s application for
supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. We
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
review de novo, Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 2014), and we
affirm.
We construe Hopkins’s pro se pleadings liberally and address his
contentions that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) improperly discounted
Hopkins’s testimony about the severity of his symptoms and, as a result, erred in
concluding that Hopkins was not disabled. See Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026,
1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (“”[W]e have an obligation where the petitioner
is pro se . . . to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the
benefit of any doubt.”).
The ALJ identified two specific, clear and convincing reasons in support of
the determination that Hopkins’s symptom testimony was not credible. First, the
ALJ properly found that Hopkins’s request for assistance with feigning psychiatric
symptoms detracted from his credibility as a reporter of his symptoms and
limitations. See Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996) (“To
determine whether the claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of her
symptoms is credible, the ALJ may consider . . . ordinary techniques of credibility
evaluation, such as the claimant’s reputation for lying, prior inconsistent
statements concerning the symptoms, and other testimony by the claimant that
appears less than candid.”). Second, although a lack of supporting medical
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evidence cannot provide the sole basis for discounting a claimant’s symptom
testimony, the ALJ permissibly considered the absence of record medical evidence
supporting symptoms and limitations as severe as those reported by Hopkins.
Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2005). As a result, the ALJ’s
findings support the conclusion that Hopkins was not credible with regard to his
limitations and pain. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002).
Moreover, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s formulation of an RFC
that took into account those limitations for which there was record support that did
not depend on Hopkins’s subjective complaints. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d
1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005). Because the functional limitations identified by the
ALJ in the RFC for medium work with limitations was supported by the record
evidence, the ALJ’s Step Five determination that Hopkins could perform work that
exists in significant numbers in the national economy is supported by substantial
evidence. See Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 756–57 (9th Cir. 1989).
AFFIRMED.
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