Stephen Farrar v. Colette Peters

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 4 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
STEPHEN L. FARRAR, No. 16-35964
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 6:15-cv-00618-KI
v.
MEMORANDUM*
COLETTE PETERS, director of O.D.O.C.;
et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Garr M. King, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 21, 2017**
Before: SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Oregon state prisoner Stephen L. Farrar appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various
constitutional violations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Farrar’s due
process claims arising from his disciplinary proceedings because Farrar failed to
raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants afforded him all
of the process that he was due. See Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455
(1985) (requirements of due process are satisfied if “some evidence” supports
disciplinary decision); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-70 (1974) (setting
forth due process requirements for prison disciplinary proceedings); see also
Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (no constitutional
entitlement to a specific administrative review procedure).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Farrar’s medical
deliberate indifference claims arising from his mental health diagnosis, change in
single cell status, and sciatic nerve pain because Farrar failed to raise a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether defendants knew of or disregarded an
excessive risk to Farrar’s health. See Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057-60 (prison
officials are deliberately indifferent only if they know of and disregard an
excessive risk to inmate health; negligence, or a difference of opinion regarding
diagnosing or treating a medical condition, does not violate a prisoner’s Eighth
Amendment rights); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002)
(requiring a showing of personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation).
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The district court properly granted summary judgment on Farrar’s retaliation
claims because Farrar failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether defendant acted with retaliatory motive. See Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d
1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth elements of a retaliation claim in the
prison context).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Farrar’s motions
for appointment of counsel because Farrar did not demonstrate “exceptional
circumstances.” Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth
standard of review and requirement of “exceptional circumstances” for
appointment of counsel).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Farrar’s motion for
appointment of an expert witness because Farrar’s claims were not so complex as
to require an independent expert. See Walker v. Am. Home Shield Long Term
Disability Plan, 180 F.3d 1065, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 1999) (setting forth standard of
review).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Farrar’s discovery
requests because Farrar failed to show that the denial of discovery would result in
actual and substantial prejudice. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th
Cir. 2002) (setting forth standard of review and describing trial court’s broad
discretion to deny discovery).
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The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Farrar’s motion for
a preliminary injunction because Farrar failed to establish that he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of such relief. See Jackson v. City and County of
San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2014) (setting forth standard of
review and standard for issuance of a preliminary injunction).
It was not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend because amendment
would be futile. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)
(standard of review).
We reject as meritless Farrar’s contentions regarding the Americans with
Disabilities Act.
AFFIRMED.
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