Marcus Wright v. J. Shartle

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 27 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARCUS DESHAWN WRIGHT, No. 16-17033
Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:16-cv-00422-RM
v.
MEMORANDUM*
J. T. SHARTLE; et al.,
Respondents-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Rosemary Marquez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 23, 2017**
Before: LEAVY, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Federal prisoner Marcus Deshawn Wright appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus petition. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the dismissal of a section
2241 petition, see Alaimalo v. United States, 645 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2011),
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
and we affirm.
Wright claims that Bureau of Prisons officials have unconstitutionally
prevented him from litigating his criminal conviction by seizing his mail and
sanctioning him with the loss of phone, visitation, and email correspondence
privileges. These claims are not cognizable under section 2241 because they do
not concern the manner, location, or conditions of his sentence’s execution. See
Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 2000). Rather, as the district
court concluded, the appropriate remedy for Wright’s claims lies in a civil rights
action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (recognizing right of prisoners to seek relief
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for denial of access to the courts); Gibson v. United States,
781 F.2d 1334, 1341 (9th Cir. 1986) (Bivens is “the judicially crafted counterpart
to section 1983”). Moreover, to the extent that Wright claims that he has been
improperly housed in the Special Housing Unit (“SHU”), this claim is moot
because Wright is no longer housed in the SHU. See Munoz v. Rowland, 104 F.3d
1096, 1097-98 (9th Cir. 1997).
All pending motions are denied.
AFFIRMED.
2 16-17033