Pernell Swahili El v. San Diego Unified School Dist.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 27 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PERNELL SWAHILI EL, No. 21-55805
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:20-cv-00257-AJB-AGS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Anthony J. Battaglia, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 17, 2022**
Before: CANBY, TASHIMA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Pernell Swahili El appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his action alleging various federal and state law claims. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion a
dismissal for failure to comply with a court order. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
639, 640 (9th Cir. 2002). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing El’s action
because El failed to file a substantive opposition to defendant’s motion to dismiss,
despite being ordered to do so. See id. at 642-43 (discussing factors to consider in
determining whether to dismiss for failure to comply with a court order).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying El’s motions to
strike. See United States v. $133,420.00 in U.S. Currency, 672 F.3d 629, 637 (9th
Cir. 2012) (standard of review). One of El’s motions to strike failed to comply
with local rules, see Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 1129 (9th Cir. 2002)
(“The district court has considerable latitude in managing the parties’ motion
practice and enforcing local rules that place parameters on briefing.”), and the
other was based on the incorrect belief that a defendant is required to file an
answer prior to the resolution of a motion to dismiss, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4) (a
responsive pleading is not required until after a motion to dismiss has been
denied).
We reject as without merit El’s contentions that the district court erred by
denying his motion for summary judgment without prejudice as premature, that the
district court erred by failing to issue a scheduling order, or that the district judge
erred by failing to recuse himself.
AFFIRMED.
2 21-55805