Raul Escandon v. County of Los Angeles

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 8 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RAUL FIELD ESCANDON, No. 16-56496
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:16-cv-02644-PSG-PLA
v.
MEMORANDUM*
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Philip S. Gutierrez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 23, 2017**
Before: McKEOWN, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Raul Field Escandon appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing
as barred by res judicata his employment action alleging violations of federal and
state laws. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo,
Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002), and we may affirm on
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
any ground supported by the record, Vestar Dev. II, LLC v. Gen. Dynamics Corp.,
249 F.3d 958, 960 (9th Cir. 2001).
The district court properly dismissed Escandon’s claims arising from the
failure to promote Escandon as barred by the doctrine of res judicata because they
arose out of the same transactional nucleus of facts as Escandon’s previous action,
and all other requirements for the application of res judicata were met. See Tahoe-
Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1077
(9th Cir. 2003) (“Res judicata is applicable whenever there is (1) an identity of
claims, (2) a final judgment on the merits, and (3) privity between parties.”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); United States ex rel. Barajas v.
Northrop Corp., 147 F.3d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Res judicata bars relitigation
of all grounds of recovery that were asserted, or could have been asserted, in a
previous action between the parties, where the previous action was resolved on the
merits.”).
Dismissal of Escandon’s claims arising from defendants’ alleged improper
influence on the judgment in the previous action was proper because Escandon
failed to allege facts sufficient to state plausible claims for relief. See Hebbe v.
Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are
liberally construed, plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim).
The district court properly dismissed Escandon’s action without leave to
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amend because amendment would have been futile. See Mirmehdi v. United
States, 689 F.3d 975, 985 (9th Cir. 2012).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by deeming Escandon’s actions
related and re-assigning the present action to the district court judge who decided
Escandon’s prior action. See Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th Cir.
1993) (district court’s compliance with local rules is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Escandon’s motion
to recuse because Escandon failed to establish grounds for such relief. See United
States v. Johnson, 610 F.3d 1138, 1147 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard of
review and grounds for recusal).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Escandon’s motion
for reconsideration of the order denying his motion to recuse because Escandon
failed to establish grounds for such relief. See United States v. Desert Gold Mining
Co., 433 F.2d 713, 715 (9th Cir. 1970) (standard of review).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal.
See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
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