Nidal Chatila v. Scottsdale Healthcare Hospital

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
JUL 17 2017
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NIDAL CHATILA, No. 16-15244
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:14-cv-02022-SRB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
SCOTTSDALE HEALTHCARE
HOSPITALS, DBA HonorHealth Deer
Valley Medical Center, DBA John C.
Lincoln Deer Valley Hospital, an Arizona
corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Susan R. Bolton, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 5, 2017
Pasadena, California
Before: BEA and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and MOTZ,** District Judge.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable J. Frederick Motz, United States District Judge for the
District of Maryland, sitting by designation.
Nadil Chatila appeals the summary judgment in favor of Scottsdale
Healthcare Hospitals (the “Hospital”) on Chatila’s claims under the Family and
Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehab Act”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1291. We affirm the judgment as to Chatila’s ADA and Rehab Act claims.
However, we reverse the judgment as to Chatila’s FMLA claim and remand to the
district court.1
1. We affirm the grant of summary judgment on the ADA and Rehab Act
claims because Chatila failed to raise a triable issue of fact that the Hospital’s
nondiscriminatory reason for its alleged adverse employment action was
pretextual. See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 49 n.3 (2003). During the
last three months of her employment as a pharmacy technician, Chatila made six
medication errors, at least one of which would have threatened the life of a patient
had the medication been administered. Chatila failed to identify any similarly-
situated Hospital employee without Chatila’s disability who also made life-
threatening medication errors but did not suffer a similar adverse employment
action. See Odima v. Westin Tucson Hotel Co., 991 F.2d 595, 602 (9th Cir. 1993)
1
Because the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural history of
this case, we recite only those facts necessary to resolve the issues raised on
appeal.
2
(comparing qualifications of employees to “ferret out discriminatory motives” of
employer).
2. However, Chatila raised triable issues of fact regarding whether she
requested FMLA leave before her purported resignation and whether the Hospital
interfered with her right to take leave under the FMLA. Chatila purportedly
resigned during a meeting with her supervisor on October 22, 2013. Chatila’s
supervisor did not dispute that, the night before the meeting, he read an email from
Chatila which stated the following: “It may be a good idea for me to take [FMLA]
to recover from the emotional factors that have put impact on my illness.” It is also
undisputed that Chatila wrote the following note on the final written warning she
received during the meeting: “Need to take full [FMLA]/I feel the medication and
illness needs working on.” When viewed in the light most favorable to Chatila, the
email and handwritten note raise a triable issue of fact regarding whether Chatila
requested FMLA leave before her purported resignation.
Chatila also raised a triable issue of fact regarding whether the Hospital
interfered with her rights under the FMLA. The FMLA makes it “unlawful for any
employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to
exercise, any right provided” under the statute. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a). The
regulations which interpret the FMLA state that “[i]n all cases, the employer
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should inquire further of the employee if it is necessary to have more information
about whether FMLA leave is being sought by the employee, and obtain the
necessary details of the leave to be taken.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(c);2 Bachelder, 259
F.3d at 1130 (“[I]t is the employer’s responsibility, not the employee’s, to
determine whether a leave request is likely to be covered by the [FMLA].”).
Chatila’s supervisor did not “inquire further” upon receipt of Chatila’s email or
note whether Chatila had requested FMLA leave. A reasonable jury could find that
the failure to do so interfered with Chatila’s attempt to exercise her rights under the
FMLA.
Chatila’s supervisor also made comments during the meeting on October 22,
2013, that raise a triable issue of fact regarding whether the Hospital interfered
with Chatila’s attempt to exercise her rights under the FMLA. During the meeting,
Chatila’s supervisor complained to Chatila that she was “putting bombshells in
between every week” when he was “trying to make a cohesive clean working
schedule.” A reasonable jury could interpret that statement as a reference to
2
See also Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1123 n.9 (9th
Cir. 2001) (“Congress authorized the Department of Labor to promulgate
regulations implementing the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. § 2654. The department’s
reasonable interpretations of [ambiguous provisions of the] statute are therefore
entitled to deference under Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984).”).
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Chatila’s requests for FMLA leave. Chatila’s supervisor also told Chatila that he
“could have done it the hard way, but . . . didn’t[,]” which a reasonable jury could
interpret as a warning to Chatila that she would be fired if she did not resign.
3. Chatila did not expressly raise a hostile work environment cause of action
in her original or amended complaint. Therefore, the district court did not err when
it refused to consider Chatila’s argument that she pleaded a separate hostile work
environment claim. See 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th
Cir. 1999).
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.
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