United States v. Ryan Masters

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
JUL 11 2017
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 16-10200
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
2:12-cr-00145-MMD-GWF-1
v.
RYAN MASTERS, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Miranda M. Du, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 16, 2017
San Francisco, California
Before: SCHROEDER, FISHER,** and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Ryan Masters appeals several supervised release conditions
imposed following his conviction for possession of 15 or more unauthorized access
devices, conspiracy to possess such devices, and aggravated identify theft. He also
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable D. Michael Fisher, United States Circuit Judge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.
appeals the term of supervised release imposed due to a discrepancy between the
oral pronouncement and the written judgment. We affirm each of the challenged
supervised release conditions, and vacate the judgment in part and remand to
conform the written judgment of sentence to the oral pronouncement.
1. Where Masters properly preserved his objections to the conditions, we
review for abuse of discretion, but we review for plain error where Masters raises a
new objection on appeal. United States v. Watson, 582 F.3d 974, 981 (9th Cir.
2009). There was no abuse or plain error. A condition imposing warrantless
searches on reasonable suspicion of a violation is well within the district court’s
discretion. See United States v. Bare, 806 F.3d 1011, 1018 (9th Cir. 2015). It was
not plain error to require Masters to contribute, limited by his ability to pay, to the
cost of mental health treatment. See United States v. Soltero, 510 F.3d 858, 865
(9th Cir. 2007). Given Masters’s sophisticated use of credit card fraud in
committing his crimes, it was not an abuse of discretion to require approval before
he opened additional lines of credit or incurred new credit card charges. See United
States v. Jeremiah, 493 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2007); U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 5D1.3(d)(2). Because contextually the approval requirement
for “negotiating or consummating new financial contracts” can only be understood
as referring to new debt obligations, and not simple cash transactions, there was no
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abuse of discretion as to that term. Similarly, the condition requiring that Masters
turn over “information” about his computer system and “related digital devices” is
not overbroad or vague, and covers only information necessary for his entire
computer system to be identified and monitored. See United States v. Goddard,
537 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008). Finally, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by imposing a supervised-release condition requiring ten months of
home confinement following Masters’s below-guidelines sentence in order to
obtain mental health treatment. See United States v. T.M., 330 F.3d 1235, 1242 (9th
Cir. 2003); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5D1.3(e)(2).
2. During the oral pronouncement of sentence, the district court stated that
supervised release for all counts would run concurrently, meaning the total term
was three years. The written judgment, however, states that one count would run
consecutively to the others, meaning the total term would be four years. In these
circumstances, both parties agree vacating the judgment in part so that the district
court may conform the written judgment to the oral pronouncement of sentence is
required. United States v. Hernandez, 795 F.3d 1159, 1169 (9th Cir. 2015).
AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.
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