Kuldip Singh v. Loretta E. Lynch

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
DEC 18 2015
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KULDIP SINGH, No. 11-71198
Petitioner, Agency No. A096-161-465
v.
MEMORANDUM*
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted December 8, 2015**
San Francisco, California
Before: WARDLAW, W. FLETCHER, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Kuldip Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the
decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the decision of the
Immigration Judge (IJ) denying his applications for asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Because the BIA “issue[d] its own
decision but relie[d] in part on the immigration judge’s reasoning, we review both
decisions.” Singh v. Holder, 753 F.3d 826, 830 (9th Cir. 2014). We deny the
petition.
1. Substantial evidence supports the denial of Singh’s asylum claim.
Because the IJ determined that Singh suffered past persecution by the Punjabi
police between the years 1998 and 2001 due to his imputed affiliation with Sikh
militants, Singh was entitled to a presumption of “a well-founded fear of
persecution.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). The government rebutted this
presumption, however, by showing that Singh could reasonably and safely relocate
to another part of India. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B); Melkonian v.
Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 1061, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). Specifically, the government
introduced evidence demonstrating that conditions for Sikhs in India have
improved significantly since 2001 and that the Punjabi police lack the resources to
pursue low-profile individuals like Singh outside of Punjab. The evidence also
indicated that Singh lived without incident in Delhi for three months in 2001, that
he was unlikely to appear in any government databases, and that his wife and three
children remain safely in India. Although the IJ and the BIA relied on Country
Reports that contained some ambiguities, they do not undermine the conclusion
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that Singh can reasonably relocate outside of Punjab. See Singh, 753 F.3d at
831–32 (denying petition for review of Sikh claimant, who was persecuted by the
Punjabi police in the 1990s, and finding that substantial evidence supported a
finding of changed country conditions despite ambiguities in Country Reports).
2. Singh argues for the first time on appeal that he is entitled to
humanitarian asylum pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii). Because Singh did
not raise this claim before the agency, he has waived this argument. Rodas-
Mendoza v. INS, 246 F.3d 1237, 1240 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
3. Because substantial evidence supports the denial of Singh’s asylum
claim, substantial evidence also supports the denial of his claim for withholding of
removal. Sowe v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1281, 1288 (9th Cir. 2008) (“When the
government rebuts an applicant’s well-founded fear of future persecution, it defeats
the applicant’s asylum claim, and his or her claim for withholding of removal.”).
4. Substantial evidence likewise supports the denial of relief under CAT.
To demonstrate eligibility for CAT relief, Singh must establish “that it is more
likely than not that he . . . would be tortured if removed to [India].” Maldonado v.
Lynch, 786 F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (quoting 8 C.F.R. §
1208.16(c)(2)). Here, Singh has not carried his burden because substantial
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evidence supports the determination that he can reasonably relocate within India
and thus avoid being tortured by the Punjabi police.
PETITION DENIED.
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