Azad Sadeeq v. Carolyn Colvin

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT APR 13 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
AZAD MOHAMMED SADEEQ, No. 13-35931
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:12-cv-01137-AC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner
of Social Security Administration,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Marco A. Hernandez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 21, 2014**
Before: HUG, FARRIS and CANBY, Circuit Judges.
Azad Mohammed Sadeeq appeals the district court’s summary judgment
order affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Sadeeq contends that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) erred by finding
at step two of the sequential evaluation process that his gout was not a severe
impairment. The ALJ reasonably inferred that because Sadeeq previously was
able to continue working despite experiencing gout symptoms and there was no
evidence that his condition worsened after his disability onset date, his gout did not
constitute a severe medically determinable impairment that would prevent
performance of his job. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012)
(“Even when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation,
we must uphold the ALJ’s findings if they are supported by inferences reasonably
drawn from the record.”).
Sadeeq next contends that the ALJ erred by discounting his testimony and
the written testimony of his wife regarding the debilitating effect of his heart
condition and leg pain. The ALJ provided specific, clear and convincing reasons
to discount Sadeeq’s testimony and the written statements of Sadeeq’s wife
regarding the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of Sadeeq’s symptoms.
First, the ALJ properly found that Sadeeq’s assertion of debilitating
limitations was undermined by the medical evidence. See Chaudhry v. Astrue, 688
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F.3d 661, 670-71 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the ALJ properly relied on medical
evidence undermining claimant’s subjective assessment of limitations). Second,
the ALJ was permitted to consider whether Sadeeq stopped working for some
reason other than his alleged disability. See Bruton v. Massanari, 268 F.3d 824,
828 (9th Cir. 2001). Third, the ALJ did not err by concluding that Sadeeq’s trip to
Mecca for a pilgrimage suggested that the alleged symptoms and limitations may
have been overstated. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir.
2008) (finding that based on claimant’s travel to Venezuela, the ALJ could
properly infer that claimant was not as physically limited as he purported to be).
The ALJ properly also gave specific germane reasons for giving little weight
to the lay witness testimony of Sadeeq’s wife because it described essentially the
same limitations as Sadeeq’s own testimony. See Valentine v. Comm’r of the Soc.
Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009).
Finally, in arguing that the ALJ’s step-four finding was not supported by
substantial evidence and that the ALJ’s hypothetical to the vocational expert was
incomplete, Sadeeq simply restates his arguments, which we already have rejected,
that the ALJ improperly discounted his testimony and the testimony of his wife in
making the residual functional capacity determination. See Stubbs-Danielson v.
Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2008).
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AFFIRMED.
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