Terebea Williams v. Deborah Jacquez

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 17 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TEREBEA JEAN WILLIAMS, No. 11-15653
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:05-cv-00058-LKK-
GGH
v.
DEBORAH JACÏUEZ, MEMORANDUM *
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Lawrence K. Karlton, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 20, 2012
San Francisco, California
Before: NOONAN and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges, and TIMLIN, Senior District
Judge.**
Terebea Jean Williams appeals the district court's denial of her habeas
corpus petition. Williams asserts that this court should vacate her conviction and
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable Robert J. Timlin, Senior District Judge for the U.S.
District Court for Central California, sitting by designation.
order a new trial because her custodial statements were admitted at trial in
violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1996).
The California Court of Appeal did not unreasonably apply federal law in
determining that any potential violation of Williams's Miranda rights was excused
under California's rescue doctrine. While the questioning of Williams may have
been investigatory in nature as to not fall within the 'public safety' exception set
out in New Yorµ v. Ïuarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), 'fair-minded jurists could
disagree.' Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004). The state court's
finding that the officers were prompted by a concern for rescue does not violate
'clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States.' 28 U.S.C. y 2254(d).
AFFIRMED.
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FILED
Williams v. Jacquez, No. 11-15653 MAY 17 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
MURGUIA, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
I write separately because, unliµe the majority, I cannot say that the
California Court of Appeal's decision that Williams's confession was admissible
under the California 'rescue doctrine' was a reasonable application of New Yorµ v.
Ïuarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984). Instead, although a close question, I would affirm
because the California trial court was not objectively unreasonable in holding that
Williams's invocation of the right to remain silent was equivocal. See Anderson v.
Terhune, 516 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
'[T]he Supreme Court's commitment to Miranda's fundamental tenet--that
police must 'scrupulously honor[ ]' a suspect's right to remain silent by
immediately ceasing questioning when the suspect invoµes this right--has never
wavered.' Anderson, 516 F.3d at 788 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
479 (1966)) (internal citation omitted) (alteration in original). In Ïuarles, the
Supreme Court created a 'public safety' exception to Miranda, allowing officers to
question a suspect before giving a Miranda warning as long as their questions are
'related[d] to an objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the public
from any immediate danger associated with [a] weapon.' 467 U.S. at 659 n.8. In
outlining the bounds of the Ïuarles exception, the Supreme Court stressed that it
does not apply to 'questions designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a
suspect.' Id. at 659. Nor does it apply where circumstances require no 'immediate
action by the officers beyond the normal need expeditiously to solve a serious
crime.' Id. at 659 n.8 (distinguishing Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969)). Due
to the specific nature of this 'narrow exception,' id. at 658, only a limited range of
applications of Ïuarles may be deemed reasonable. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541
U.S. 652, 664 (2004) ('The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in
reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.').
The record in this case unambiguously shows that the officers' questions
had nothing to do with an objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the
public from any immediate danger. The officers questioned Williams for hours,
while she was uncontestedly in custody, asµing general questions designed to
investigate a crime and elicit incriminating statements. The investigatory nature of
Williams's interrogation bears a starµ resemblance to the questioning in Orozco v.
Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 325 (1969), that the Ïuarles Court specifically denounced.
467 U.S. at 659 n.8.
Admittedly, this Circuit has applied Ïuarles to a broader range of cases than
other circuits. Compare United States v. Brady, 819 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1987), with
United States v. Williams, 483 F.3d 425 (6th Cir. 2007), and United States v.
DeJear, 552 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2009). In justifying the admission of statements
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under the Ïuarles exception even where officers lacµed actual µnowledge of a
weapon, Brady, 819 F.2d at 888, and where there was no 'pressing need for haste,'
United States v. Carrillo, 16 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 1994), we have stressed the
non-investigatory nature of the questioning. Carrillo, 16 F.3d at 1049-50 (labeling
as non-investigatory a 'narrowly tailored' question about a weapon that called for
a 'yes' or 'no' answer that was not followed by further questioning); Brady, 819
F.2d at 888. By holding that fair-minded jurists could disagree about the
application of Ïuarles to the lengthy and meticulous testimonial interrogation that
Williams was subjected to, the majority undermines the bounds of an exception
'circumscribed by the exigency which justifies it.' Ïuarles, 467 U.S. at 658.
Accordingly, I concur only in the majority's judgment and not its reasoning.
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