Jon Felt v. Carolyn Colvin

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MAY 07 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
JON W. FELT, No. 13-35865
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:12-cv-00170-JPH
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington
James P. Hutton, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 5, 2015**
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, D.W. NELSON, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.
Jon W. Felt appeals the district court’s order affirming the Commissioner of
Social Security’s denial of his application for supplemental security income
benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. At step five of the sequential
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument, see Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2), and Felt’s motion to submit
this case on the briefs is granted.
evaluation process, the administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Felt could
perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Molina v. Astrue, 674
F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012), and we affirm.
The ALJ did not err in giving no weight to the contradicted opinion of
treating psychologist Dr. W. Scott Mabee that Felt’s psychological limitations
prevented him from working. The ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons,
supported by substantial evidence, for giving Dr. Mabee’s opinion no weight by
stating that Dr. Mabee’s opinion relied upon Felt’s contradicted, subjective reports
regarding the severity of his disability and did not address the numerous
inconsistencies in the medical evidence. See Valentine v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec
Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 692 (9th Cir. 2009).
The ALJ accommodated all of Felt’s limitations in the residual functional
capacity (RFC) assessment and in her hypothetical questions to the vocational
expert. The ALJ’s determination that Felt had the RFC to perform work that only
included simple and repetitive one-to-three step tasks, did not involve detailed
work, and only required occasional contact with the public, was consistent with the
restrictions identified by the examining psychologists. See Stubbs-Danielson v.
Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008). Moreover, the ALJ’s RFC
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determination and associated hypothetical questions posed to the vocational expert
pertaining to Felt’s restrictions “contained all of the limitations that the ALJ found
credible and supported by substantial evidence in the record.” See Bayliss v.
Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005); Roberts v. Shalala, 66 F.3d 179,
184 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that the ALJ is not bound to accept as true restrictions
in hypothetical questions propounded by claimant's counsel that are not supported
by substantial evidence).
AFFIRMED.
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