Raymond Hume v. Andrew Saul

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 28 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RAYMOND HUME, No. 17-35912
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:16-cv-01766-SB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Stacie F. Beckerman, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 26, 2019**
Before: FARRIS, TROTT, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
Raymond Hume appeals the district court’s affirmance of the Commissioner
of Social Security’s denial of his application for disability insurance benefits and
supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
(Act). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We
review de novo, Attmore v. Colvin, 827 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2016), and we
reverse and remand for further proceedings.
The ALJ provided a specific and legitimate reason for assigning little weight
to treating psychologist Dr. Born’s opinion as to the degree of limitation caused by
Hume’s mental health impairments. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035,
1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Born’s opinion was inconsistent with
the normal mental status findings reported by other doctors. Because the ALJ
provided a specific and legitimate reason for assigning little weight to Dr. Born’s
opinion, any error in the ALJ’s additional reasoning was harmless. See Molina v.
Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012).
Substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s step-four finding that Hume
is capable of performing his past work as a surveillance system monitor as actually
performed. See Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 844 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Although
the burden of proof lies with the claimant at step four, the ALJ still has a duty to
make the requisite factual findings to support his conclusion.”). Hume’s testimony
indicates that his past work as actually performed includes functional demands that
exceed the limitations in his RFC to “simple tasks, routine and repetitive tasks”
and “only occasional interaction with coworkers and the public.” Because the ALJ
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did not discount this testimony or make any findings as to how Hume’s past work
was actually performed, substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s step-four
finding. See id. at 847 (by failing to make specific findings as to the actual
demands of past work, the ALJ provided no basis on which to review the agency
decision). We remand for the ALJ to reconsider the step-four conclusion and, if
necessary, proceed to step five.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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