Van Henry Jordan, Jr. v. Carolyn W. Colvin

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MAY 15 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
VAN HENRY JORDAN, Jr., No. 13-15371
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:12-cv-00953-NVW
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner
of Social Security Administration,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Neil V. Wake, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 13, 2015**
San Francisco, California
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, IKUTA, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Van Henry Jordan, Jr. appeals from the district court’s order affirming the
Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) denial of benefits. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
The ALJ did not err in discounting Jordan’s testimony about the severity and
intensity of his symptoms because she gave “specific, clear and convincing
reasons” for doing so, see Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012)
(internal quotation marks omitted), including that Jordan responded favorably to
conservative treatment and worked only sporadically prior to the alleged disability
onset date, both of which undermine a claimant’s testimony that he is unable to
work due to disabling pain, see Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th
Cir. 2008); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002). The ALJ
properly relied on Jordan’s daily activities to discount his testimony because they
contradict his “claims of a totally debilitating impairment” even if Jordan did not
spend a substantial part of his day engaged in them. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1113.
The ALJ also did not err in discounting the opinions of the two nurse
practitioners who treated Jordan because they are not acceptable medical sources,
see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a), (d)(1), and the ALJ gave “reasons germane to each
witness for doing so,” see Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 2014)
(internal quotation marks omitted), including that their opinions departed
substantially from the rest of the medical evidence in the record and were
inconsistent with Jordan’s recent work activities. Even if some of the ALJ’s
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reasons for discounting their opinions were not valid, any error was harmless in
light of the valid reasons the ALJ provided. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115.
The ALJ properly relied on the opinions of Dr. Cunningham, Dr. Holly, and
Dr. Bargan in assessing Jordan’s residual functional capacity (RFC), given that
Dr. Cunningham was an examining physician, see Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1160, and
Drs. Holly and Bargan’s opinions are supported by the objective medical evidence,
see Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). The ALJ was
not required to set forth specific reasons for favoring Dr. Cunningham’s opinion
over the nurse practitioners’ opinions because nurse practitioners cannot be
considered treating sources, see SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *2. Cf. Orn v.
Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 633–34 (9th Cir. 2007). The ALJ did not independently
assess the medical evidence or substitute her opinion for that of medical testimony,
but rather resolved conflicts in the medical evidence, which is precisely the ALJ’s
role. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041, 1043 (9th Cir. 1995). Although
some new evidence about Jordan’s condition was discovered after the physicians’
assessments, this evidence was presented to the ALJ, who determined it was
consistent with their assessments.
Evidence in the record supports each of the functional limitations found by
the ALJ in her RFC assessment. The regulations do not require that the ALJ’s
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RFC finding directly correspond to a specific medical opinion. See Bayliss v.
Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005).
AFFIRMED.
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