United States v. Rafael Ramiro-Medina

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 26 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 19-50382
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
3:19-cr-02028-GPC-1
v.
RAFAEL RAMIRO-MEDINA, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Gonzalo P. Curiel, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted August 6, 2021
Pasadena, California
Before: PAEZ, CALLAHAN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Rafael Ramiro-Medina appeals his conviction for four counts of transporting
undocumented immigrants and aiding and abetting in violation of 8 U.S.C. §
1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), (v)(II). The only issue on appeal is the district court’s denial of
a challenge under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), to the government’s
peremptory strike of a Hispanic woman, Juror Caudillo. We have jurisdiction
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
“We generally review a district court’s Batson determination for clear error
because of the intrinsically factual nature of the claim. However, where the district
court applies the wrong legal standard, we review the claim de novo.” United
States v. Collins, 551 F.3d 914, 919 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Because
Ramiro-Medina argues that the district court did not comply with the Batson
framework, we review de novo.
Batson established a three-step, burden-shifting framework to determine
whether an attorney engaged in purposeful discrimination when exercising
peremptory strikes. See id. First, “the defendant must make a prima facie showing
that the challenge was based on an impermissible ground, such as race.” Id. (citing
Batson, 476 U.S. at 96). “Second, if the trial court finds the defendant has made a
prima facie case of discrimination, the burden then shifts to the prosecution to offer
a race-neutral reason for the challenge that relates to the case.” Id. (quoting Green
v. LaMarque, 532 F.3d 1028, 1030 (9th Cir. 2008)). “Third, if the prosecutor
offers a race-neutral explanation, the trial court must decide whether the defendant
has proved the prosecutor’s motive for the strike was purposeful racial
discrimination.” Id. (quoting Green, 532 F.3d at 1030).
Ramiro-Medina argues that the district court misapplied the first step of the
Batson analysis. Any error at step one, however, is moot if there is no error at
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steps two and three. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991).
The district court did not misapply step two of the Batson inquiry. The
government had unsuccessfully sought to strike Juror Caudillo for cause,
explaining that she had expressed concern about remaining impartial due to her
views of the federal government’s family separation policy.1 Moments later, after
Ramiro-Medina’s Batson objection, the district court noted the government’s
previously provided race-neutral reason for seeking to strike Juror Caudillo, and
the government implicitly adopted this reason at step two during a supplemental
Batson hearing.
The district court, however, arguably misapplied step three of the Batson
analysis by not expressly determining whether purposeful discrimination occurred.
Although the district court noted that “there was a basis to challenge Ms. Caudillo
in good faith” and that the government had “offered [that basis] in good faith,” step
three of the Batson analysis requires a court to “undertake a sensitive inquiry” into
the available “circumstantial and direct evidence of intent.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 93(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also United States v. Alanis,
335 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 2003) (“It is not enough that the district court
1
After the government’s for cause challenge, the district court noted that it was
“satisfied that [Juror Caudillo] is prepared to compartmentalize and set aside these
experiences or this knowledge that she referenced,” and declined to remove her for
cause.
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considered the government’s [race]-neutral explanations ‘plausible.’ Instead, it is
necessary that the district court make a deliberate decision whether purposeful
discrimination occurred.”).
But even if the district court so erred, because the record is adequately
developed, we can review de novo the third step of the Batson analysis without
remanding for a factual hearing. United States v. Alvarez-Ulloa, 784 F.3d 558,
565–66 (9th Cir. 2015). We conclude that Ramiro-Medina has not established that
purposeful racial discrimination occurred. The government had legitimate
concerns about whether Juror Caudillo could be impartial, given the nature of the
charges against Ramiro-Medina. There is no evidence that the government failed
to strike non-Hispanic jurors who shared similar concerns. And the seated jury
included at least two Hispanic jurors.
Because the government offered a race-neutral reason for the peremptory
challenge and we conclude that the government did not engage in purposeful
discrimination, any error at step one is moot. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359.
AFFIRMED.
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