Robert Snyder v. Kathleen Allison

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 26 2021
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROBERT R. SNYDER, No. 21-55105
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:19-cv-01741-LAB-DEB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
KATHLEEN ALLISON, Warden, CDCR
Secretary; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 17, 2021**
Before: SILVERMAN, CHRISTEN, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Robert Snyder appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging access-to-courts
and retaliation claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
447 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Snyder’s action because Snyder failed
to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d
338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are construed liberally, a
plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for
relief); see also Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415, 417 (2002) (to plead
an actual injury for a access-to-courts claim, the complaint “should state the
underlying claim in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a),[ ] just
as if it were being independently pursued”); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349-53
(1996) (elements of an access-to-courts claim and actual injury requirement);
Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (setting forth elements
of a retaliation claim in the prison context).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Snyder leave to
amend because amendment would have been futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide
Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of
review and stating that leave to amend may be denied where amendment would be
futile); Chodos v. West Publ’g Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining
that a district court's discretion to deny leave to amend is “particularly broad” when
it has previously granted leave to amend).
We do not consider Snyder’s challenge to the denial of his motion for a
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temporary restraining order because in Case No. 19-56521, we concluded that we
lacked jurisdiction over such a challenge.
We reject as unsupported by the record Snyder’s contention that the district
court failed to analyze properly his amended complaints.
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
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