Reza Nagahi v. Employment Development Dept.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MAY 4 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
REZA NAGAHI, No. 18-15074
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 5:07-cv-06268-EJD
v.
MEMORANDUM*
EMPLOYMENT DEVELOPMENT
DEPARTMENT; DEBORAH BRONOW;
JAMES CRAWLEY; PAULINE GEE;
TALBOTT A. SMITH; FORREST E.
BOOMER; PETER KINDSCHI; TOM
CAMPBELL, in their individual and
official capacities, as present or former
officers of California Employment
Development Department,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
R. ALEXANDER ACOSTA, in his official
capacity as the United States Secretary of
Labor,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
for the Northern District of California
Edward J. Davila, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 4, 2022 **
Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges
Reza Nagahi appeals the district court’s order following a remand from this
court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district
court’s findings of fact for clear error and conclusions of law de novo. Lee v. West
Coast Life Ins. Co., 688 F.3d 1004, 1009 (9th Cir. 2012). We affirm.
We previously remanded this case for the district court to consider two
“possible” forms of relief to which Nagahi might be entitled, including: (1) “a
written notification regarding his application for Remedial Education benefits” and
(2) “the appropriate measure of Additional Trade Readjustment Allowance (TRA)
monetary benefits to which he is entitled by statute.”
The district court complied with this order on remand. First, it is undisputed
that Nagahi received his written notice regarding Remedial Education benefits.
Second, after considering the evidence submitted by the parties, the district court
held that Nagahi was not entitled to Additional TRA benefits. This holding is
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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well-supported by the undisputed facts and law. Nagahi conceded that he was
temporarily employed in February and March of 2005 and did not apply for
unemployment insurance benefits. Even though Nagahi quit the job, he may have
qualified for unemployment benefits if he quit for good cause. Exhaustion of
unemployment insurance benefits is a prerequisite for the receipt of TRA benefits.
19 U.S.C. § 2291(a)(3)(B) (2005); 20 C.F.R. § 617.11(a)(2)(v)(A) (2005).
Contrary to Nagahi’s allegation, the 2007 state administrative decision did not
award Additional TRA benefits. It found that: (1) Nagahi’s application was timely
in light of the defendants’ failure to give him notice of the application deadline and
(2) benefits were payable, provided he was “otherwise eligible.” The district court
faithfully complied with our previous remand order. We find no error in its ruling.
Nagahi argues that res judicata barred the defendants from raising statutory
eligibility on remand. However, no agency decision actually litigated and
necessarily decided whether Nagahi had exhausted his unemployment benefits.
See White v. City of Pasadena, 671 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2012) (setting forth the
elements of res judicata).
Nor did judicial estoppel preclude the defendants from arguing that Nagahi
was not statutorily eligible for benefits. Defendants did not concede statutory
eligibility. See Baughman v. Walt Disney World Co., 685 F.3d 1131, 1133 (9th
3
Cir. 2012) (explaining that judicial estoppel only applies if the party’s position is
“clearly inconsistent with its earlier position.”).
Finally, there is no evidence of bias on the part of the district judge.
Adverse rulings, alone, do not warrant recusal or establish bias. Leslie v. Grupo
ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1160 (9th Cir. 1999).
AFFIRMED.
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