Donald Beaty v. Charles Ryan

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FEB 14 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DONALD EDWARD BEATY, No. 10-17044
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:92-cv-02076-SRB
v.
MEMORANDUM *
CHARLES L. RYAN,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Susan R. Bolton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 4, 2011 **
San Francisco, California
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, GRABER, and MCKEOWN, Circuit Judges
Donald Edward Beaty appeals the district court’s dismissal of his
“Stipulation for Order Allowing Confidential Contact Visit with Petitioner” for
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
lack of jurisdiction. As the facts are known to the parties, they will be repeated
here only as necessary to explain our decision.
We construe Beaty’s “Stipulation” as a motion for an order directing the
Arizona Department of Corrections to authorize a visit between Beaty and a
neuropsychologist. Although Beaty filed the motion under the case number
previously assigned to his federal habeas petition, the motion is not in any way
connected to his habeas case. Rather, Beaty claims that the requested contact visit
is “for purposes of [his] clemency petition.”
It is fundamental that a “federal court’s jurisdiction is limited to cases or
controversies.” Am. Rivers v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 126 F.3d 1118, 1123
(9th Cir. 1997) (citing U.S. Const. art III, § 2). Beaty’s motion is not connected to
his terminated federal habeas petition. Furthermore, his state clemency application
is not a case or controversy pending in federal court. Indeed, the clemency
application is not even a judicial proceeding pending in state court; it is a state
administrative proceeding governed by state law. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 31-401 to
31-403.
Beaty argues, however, that 18 U.S.C. § 3599 confers jurisdiction on the
district court to issue an order to a state prison authorizing a contact visit in the
course of his state clemency application. We disagree. In Harbison v. Bell, the
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Supreme Court held that section 3599 “authorizes federally appointed counsel to
represent their clients in state clemency proceedings and entitles them to
compensation for that representation.” 129 S. Ct. 1481, 1491 (2009). With respect
to the hiring of experts, section 3599(f) provides that “[u]pon a finding that [ ]
expert . . . services are reasonably necessary for the representation of the defendant
. . . the court may authorize the defendant’s attorneys to obtain such services on
behalf of the defendant and, if so authorized, shall order the payment of fees and
expenses therefor under subsection (g).” Section 3599(f) therefore empowers
federal courts to authorize federally appointed attorneys to hire experts with federal
money for the purpose of state clemency petitions. However, Harbison provides
no support for Beaty’s argument that section 3599 confers jurisdiction on district
courts to issue orders to state prisons in furtherance of these state clemency
applications. We therefore reject Beaty’s argument that the district court had
jurisdiction to issue the order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3599.
The district court did not err in dismissing Beaty’s “Stipulation” for lack of
jurisdiction.
AFFIRMED.
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