Narviez Alexander v. State of Nevada

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JUN 19 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
NARVIEZ V. ALEXANDER, No. 12-16618
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:11-cv-00217-LRH-
WGC
v.
STATE OF NEVADA, NEVADA MEMORANDUM*
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et
al.,
Defendants,
and
HOWARD SKOLNIK, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Larry R. Hicks, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 9, 2015
San Francisco, California
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Page 2 of 3
Before: CHRISTEN and WATFORD, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF,** District
Judge.
1. The district court properly granted summary judgment to defendants on
Alexander’s Eighth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Even if we
assume, as did the district court, that Alexander has a serious medical need
(whether on account of his sickle cell trait or for other reasons), there is no genuine
dispute as to whether prison medical personnel were deliberately indifferent to it.
Prison doctors ran a battery of tests, including repeated tests of the oxygen
saturation of Alexander’s blood, before concluding that there was no objective
medical support for Alexander’s theory that the elevation at Ely State Prison
caused him severe pain associated with his sickle cell trait. In the absence of any
objective correlate to Alexander’s pain complaints, no reasonable jury could find
the doctors deliberately indifferent to Alexander’s condition.
2. The district court properly granted summary judgment to defendants on
Alexander’s due process claim. He has not alleged an “atypical and significant
hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life,” Sandin v. Conner,
515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Placement in administrative segregation alone generally
does not implicate a liberty interest, Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th
**
The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, District Judge for the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
Page 3 of 3
Cir. 2003), and Alexander has not provided any objective medical support for his
claim that, as in Serrano, 345 F.3d at 1079, the combination of his medical issues
and conditions of confinement rises to the level of an “atypical and significant
hardship.” Even if Alexander has shown such a hardship, he received due process
in the form of regular re-evaluations of his housing assignment. That the prison on
occasion fell short of procedures set forth in the Nevada Department of Corrections
regulations demanding such review every thirty days is not a matter of
constitutional dimension.
3. The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to appoint a
medical expert. Such an expert’s testimony would have, at best, established a
difference of medical opinion, which would not be sufficient to support
Alexander’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim. See Sanchez v.
Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). Nor was the district court’s refusal to
grant Alexander Internet access for research purposes an abuse of discretion.
Alexander cites no authority holding that a district court is compelled to grant such
access in these circumstances.
4. Appellant’s motion for judicial notice, filed September 29, 2014, is
DENIED.
AFFIRMED.