Edward Sager v. Carolyn Colvin

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NOV 06 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
EDWARD J. SAGER, No. 13-36084
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 4:12-cv-00102-RKS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Keith Strong, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 4, 2015**
Portland, Oregon
Before: KOZINSKI, FISHER and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Edward Sager appeals the judgment of the district court affirming the
decision of the administrative law judge (ALJ) denying his application for social
security disability benefits. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
review de novo, see Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1231 (9th Cir. 2010), and we
affirm.
1. The ALJ did not improperly reject the opinions of Sager’s treating
physicians. Dr. Peterson’s conclusory opinion that Sager was unable to work was
not a “medical opinion” but rather a question reserved to the ALJ. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(d), (d)(1). The ALJ was not required to discuss every medical finding
in the records of Dr. Peterson and Dr. Kelly. See Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart,
341 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2003). Nor was the ALJ required to credit Sager’s
subjective complaints merely because they were recorded in his physicians’
records. See Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir.
2004).
2. The ALJ offered specific, clear and convincing reasons for rejecting
Sager’s testimony about the severity of his symptoms. See Lingenfelter v. Astrue,
504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007). Sager failed to comply with treatment
recommendations to quit smoking, take prescribed medications, have epidural
injections, consistently perform a home exercise program and consider spinal cord
stimulation treatment. This noncompliance undermines his claims of debilitating
pain. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008); Burch v.
Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005). The ALJ also found the medical
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evidence did not substantiate Sager’s subjective allegations of disabling
limitations. This too was a proper reason to discount Sager’s testimony. See
Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (“While subjective pain
testimony cannot be rejected on the sole ground that it is not fully corroborated by
objective medical evidence, the medical evidence is still a relevant factor in
determining the severity of the claimant’s pain and its disabling effects.”).
3. The ALJ did not pose an incomplete hypothetical to the vocational
expert. The hypothetical properly included only those limitations that the ALJ
found were supported by substantial evidence. See Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin.,
466 F.3d 880, 886 (9th Cir. 2006).
AFFIRMED.
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