Michael McCoy v. Canyon County Sheriff

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOV 30 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL C. McCOY, No. 14-35918
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 1:14-cv-00327-BLW
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CANYON COUNTY SHERIFF; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
B. Lynn Winmill, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 18, 2015**
Before: TASHIMA, OWENS, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Michael C. McCoy appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims
relating to the civil forfeiture of his vehicle. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Hamilton v.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2011), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed McCoy’s due process claim against
Yamomoto because Yamomoto was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. See
Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987) (court clerks are
entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages claims when they
perform tasks integral to the judicial process).
The district court properly dismissed McCoy’s due process claims against
the Canyon County Sheriff and Fisher on the ground they were entitled to qualified
immunity because it would not have been clear to every reasonable officer, at the
time of the vehicle’s seizure, that the crime of conviction would be simple
possession of a controlled substance rather than possession with intent to deliver or
distribute a controlled substance. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080,
2083 (2011) (explaining two-part test for qualified immunity).
The district court properly dismissed McCoy’s Fourth Amendment claims as
barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because success on those
claims would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of McCoy’s conviction. See
id. at 486-87.
The district court properly dismissed McCoy’s access-to-courts claim
because McCoy had no right of access to litigate his forfeiture claim. See Simmons
2 14-35918
v. Sacramento Cnty. Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 2003)
(explaining that “a prisoner has no constitutional right of access to the courts to
litigate an unrelated civil claim”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to retain
supplemental jurisdiction over McCoy’s state law claims once the federal claims
had been dismissed. See Tritchler v. County of Lake, 358 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th
Cir. 2004) (standard of review).
We reject McCoy’s contention that the district court judge was prejudiced
against him.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
AFFIRMED.
3 14-35918