Trevor Ryan v. Jeffrey Thomas

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION OCT 11 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TREVOR RYAN, No. 12-35462
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:11-cv-00448-MO
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JEFFREY THOMAS,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Michael W. Mosman, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 9, 2013**
Portland, Oregon
Before: SILVERMAN, W. FLETCHER, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Trevor Ryan appeals from the district court’s denial of his 42 U.S.C.
§ 2241 petition for writ of habeas corpus on his claim that the Bureau of Prisons
improperly denied him eligibility for early release under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2).
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. We review de novo
the denial of a § 2241 petition, see Bowen v. Hood, 202 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir.
2000), and we affirm.
The district court correctly held that the BOP did not violate retroactivity
principles by applying its March 16, 2009 regulations in determining that Ryan
was ineligible for a § 3621 early release incentive. Because Ryan had not received
notification of his eligibility before the effective date of the regulations, he had no
settled expectation of early release and his retroactivity argument fails. See
Furguiel v. Benov, 155 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[A] prisoner’s
expectation of early release may only arise when the BOP makes a lawful
determination of the prisoner’s eligibility and then informs the prisoner of such
eligibility . . . . In order to urge a retroactivity argument, a prisoner’s notice of
early release must have accrued prior to the promulgation of [the regulations].”
(emphasis omitted)).
AFFIRMED.