Stephanie Tashiro-Townley v. Bank of New York Mellon Corp.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 5 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
STEPHANIE TASHIRO-TOWNLEY; No. 16-35590
SCOTT C. TOWNLEY,
D.C. No. 2:10-cv-01720-JCC
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. MEMORANDUM*
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORP.,
as Trustee for the Certificateholders CWL,
Inc. Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2005-
10; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
John C. Coughenour, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 26, 2017**
Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Stephanie Tashiro-Townley and Scott C. Townley appeal pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing their diversity action related to their claim
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
under the Washington Consumer Protection Act (“WCPA”). We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1071-72 (9th Cir. 2005). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed appellants’ action because appellants
failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants engaged in an unfair or
deceptive act that caused appellants’ injury. See Bavand v. OneWest Bank, 385
P.3d 233, 247-48 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016) (setting forth elements for challenges
under the WCPA); see also Wash Rev. Code. § 61.24.30(4) (setting forth
shortened notice requirements for a trustee’s sale conducted after a federal
bankruptcy stay is lifted); Bain v. Metro. Mortg. Grp., Inc., 285 P.3d 34, 52 (Wash.
2012) (en banc) (explaining that “the mere fact MERS is listed on the deed of trust
as a beneficiary is not itself an actionable injury”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellants leave to
file a second amended complaint because amendment would be futile. See
Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011)
(setting forth standard of review and explaining that leave to amend can be denied
if amendment would be futile).
We reject as without merit appellants’ contentions regarding equal
2 16-35590
protection and due process.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
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