Gary Harrington v. Larry Menteer

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 24 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GARY ALLEN HARRINGTON, No. 17-35610
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:16-cv-00200-CL
v.
MEMORANDUM*
LARRY MENTEER, Assistant Water
Master, District 13; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Michael J. McShane, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 15, 2018**
Before: SILVERMAN, BEA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Gary Allen Harrington appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and we may affirm on any basis
supported by the record. Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir.
2008). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Harrington’s false arrest, false
imprisonment, cruel and unusual punishment, and due process claims because
Harrington failed to file his action within the applicable two-year statute of
limitations. See Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009)
(explaining that the statute of limitations for § 1983 actions is the state law statute
of limitations for personal injury actions, and that the applicable Oregon statute of
limitations is two years).
The district court properly dismissed Harrington’s trespass, breach of
fiduciary duty, takings, and impairment of contractual obligation claims for
damages because it would not have been clear to every reasonable state official
that entering Harrington’s property and taking action authorized by a court order
was unlawful under the circumstances. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741
(2011) (discussing qualified immunity and noting that a right is clearly established
only if “every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing
2 17-35610
violates that right” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
To the extent any of Harrington’s claims are not time-barred and seek
injunctive relief, dismissal of such claims was proper because they constitute a
forbidden “de facto appeal” of prior state court judgments against Harrington or
are “inextricably intertwined” with those judgments. See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d
1148, 1163-65 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing proper application of the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine); see also Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 616 (9th
Cir. 2007) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred plaintiff’s claim because the relief
sought “would require the district court to determine that the state court’s decision
was wrong and thus void”).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or documents and facts not presented to the district court. See
Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Elias,
921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990).
AFFIRMED.
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