Justin R. Ex Rel. Jennifer R. v. Matayoshi

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MAR 10 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
JUSTIN R., by and through his mother No. 12-16048
Jennifer R. and JENNIFER R.,
D.C. No. 1:10-cv-00657-LEK-
Plaintiffs - Appellants, RLP
v.
MEMORANDUM*
KATHRYN MATAYOSHI, in her official
capacity as Superintendent of the Hawai‘i
Public Schools and STATE OF HAWAI‘I
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawai‘i
Leslie E. Kobayashi, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 19, 2014
Honolulu, Hawai‘i
Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
By and through his mother, Jennifer R., Justin R. (collectively, “Justin”) appeals
the district court’s denial of attorney fees and costs based on its finding that
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Appellants lacked “prevailing party” status under the Individuals with Disabilities in
Education Act’s (“IDEA”) attorney fees provision, 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (i)(3). The
denial followed litigation and a settlement reached with the Hawai‘i Public Schools
and the Hawai‘i Department of Education (collectively, “Matayoshi”). We reverse
and remand.
Under the IDEA, a district court, “in its discretion, may award reasonable
attorney[ ] fees as part of the costs . . . . to a prevailing party who is the parent of a
child with a disability[.]” 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (i)(3)(B). Buckhannon Board and Care
Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S.
598 (2001), teaches that to be a “prevailing party,” a litigant must demonstrate it has
obtained a judicially sanctioned material alteration of the parties’ legal relationship.
“Buckhannon's definition of ‘prevailing party’ applies to the IDEA's attorney[ ] fees
provision[.]” Shapiro ex rel. Shapiro v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 69,
374 F.3d 857, 865 (9th Cir. 2004).
The parties agree that their settlement agreement constitutes a material
alteration of their legal relationship. See also Richard S. v. Dep't of Developmental
Servs. of State of California, 317 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2003). Barrios v.
California Interscholastic Federation, 277 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
537 U.S. 820 (2002), answers the remaining question, whether there was sufficient
2
judicial imprimatur over this alteration. Barrios holds that a plaintiff who enters into
an enforceable private settlement agreement providing for judicial resolution of
attorney fees is a “prevailing party.” 277 F.3d at 1134. The Barrios court determined
that the parties’ settlement agreement possessed the requisite judicial imprimatur
since, “in [it], [the parties] agreed that the district court would retain jurisdiction over
the issue of attorney[ ] fees.”1 Id. at 1134 n.5; see Richard S., 317 F.3d at 1086-87.
As in Barrios, the parties agreed in the settlement agreement that the district
court “shall retain jurisdiction to determine the issue of Plaintiffs’ entitlement to
reasonable attorney[ ] fees and costs, if any[.]”2 In addition, the Stipulation and Order
explicitly refers to the verbal settlement reached before a magistrate judge during a
court-initiated settlement conference and reserves jurisdiction for the court to decide
the attorney fees issue. Because the settlement agreement resulted in a material
alteration of the parties’ legal relationship and the Stipulation and Order and
settlement agreement provided sufficient judicial imprimatur, Justin is the prevailing
party under the IDEA’s fee provision, 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (i)(3)(B). See Barrios, 277
1
Contrary to Matayoshi’s argument, the terms of the settlement in Barrios were
not incorporated into the district court record. See Barrios, 277 F.3d at 1133.
2
As in this case, the settlement at issue in Barrios did not state the plaintiff was
entitled to attorney fees; instead, the settlement reserved the issue of “whether any
party” is a prevailing party entitled to attorney fees “for the Court to decide upon
motion by any party.” Barrios, 277 F.3d at 1133 (emphasis added).
3
F.3d 1128. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the district court to determine the
amount of fees and costs.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
4