Carr v. Los Angeles County Department of Auditor-Controller

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAR 12 2018
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CARLA CARR, an individual, No. 16-56553
Plaintiff-Appellant, DC No. CV 16-0506 GHK
v.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY MEMORANDUM*
DEPARTMENT OF AUDITOR-
CONTROLLER, a local public entity;
DOES,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
George H. King, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 6, 2018**
Pasadena, California
Before: REINHARDT, TASHIMA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Carla Carr appeals the district court’s dismissal on claim preclusion grounds
of her employment discrimination action against the Los Angeles County
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
Department of the Auditor-Controller (the “County”). Because Carr’s federal
action seeks redress for the same injuries as her prior state court lawsuit, which
was resolved against her on the merits, Carr’s federal action is barred by California
claim preclusion law. We therefore affirm.
1. Carr contends that her federal action involves a different primary right
than her California state court lawsuit. “In determining the preclusive effect of a
state-court judgment, this court must ‘refer to the preclusion law of the State in
which judgment was rendered.’” Diruzza v. Cty. of Tehama, 323 F.3d 1147, 1152
(9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S.
373, 380 (1985)). In California, res judicata applies if:
(1) A claim or issue raised in the present action is identical to a claim
or issue litigated in a prior proceeding; (2) the prior proceeding resulted in a final
judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom the doctrine is being
asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding.
People v. Barragan, 83 P.3d 480, 492 (Cal. 2004) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted). Carr concedes that the second and third elements apply.
To determine whether a claim is identical to a claim litigated in a prior
proceeding, California courts apply the “primary rights theory.” Boeken v. Philip
Morris USA, Inc., 230 P.3d 342, 348 (Cal. 2010). Under that theory, a “cause of
action is the right to obtain redress for a harm suffered, regardless of the specific
2
remedy sought or the legal theory . . . advanced.” Id. “[T]he determinative factor
is the harm suffered. When two actions involving the same parties seek
compensation for the same harm, they generally involve the same primary right.”
Id.; accord Adam Bros. Farming, Inc. v. Cty. of Santa Barbara, 604 F.3d 1142,
1149 (9th Cir. 2010).
Carr’s federal action is premised on the same injuries – the County’s adverse
employment actions – as her California state court lawsuit; the federal complaint
differs from the state complaint only in its allegations about the County’s
discriminatory motivations. The two lawsuits involve different legal theories, but
seek to vindicate the same primary rights. Moreover, Carr was aware of and able
to raise her race discrimination claims in state court. In fact, Carr alleged race
discrimination on charges filed with the California Department of Fair
Employment and Housing prior to her state court suit. Carr’s federal action is
therefore barred by California claim preclusion law.1
2. Carr also contends that her federal action is premised on different
harms than those litigated in state court because her substantive due process claim
seeks redress for the County’s racially discriminatory litigation conduct.
1
Because we affirm the district court’s dismissal on claim preclusion
grounds, we do not reach the County’s alternative argument that Carr’s federal
claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
3
However, Carr’s complaint includes no factual allegations or legal contentions
related to the County’s conduct during the state court lawsuit or administrative
proceedings; it is entirely focused on the County’s adverse employment actions.
Carr has not identified any factual allegations suggesting that leave to amend to
develop her discriminatory litigation claim would be anything but futile.
Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008).
• ! •
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
4