Matt Jacobsen v. Clear Recon Corporation

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 19 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MATT P. JACOBSEN, No. 17-15843
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:15-cv-00504-MMD-
VPC
v.
CLEAR RECON CORPORATION; et al., MEMORANDUM*
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Miranda M. Du, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 12, 2018**
Before: LEAVY, HAWKINS, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
Matt P. Jacobsen appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims arising out of
foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo both the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim under
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and summary judgment. Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler
Corp., 534 F.3d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 2008). We may affirm on any basis
supported by the record, Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir.
2008), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Jacobsen’s Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act claims because Jacobsen failed to allege facts sufficient to state
plausible claims for relief. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692f, 1692g; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Dismissal of Jacobsen’s quiet title claim was proper because Jacobsen failed
to allege facts sufficient to show that HSBC Bank USA, N.A. did not have
standing to foreclose on Jacobsen’s property. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 40.010;
Chapman v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 302 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Nev. 2013) (“A
plea to quiet title [under Nevada law] does not require any particular elements, but
each party must plead and prove his or her own claim to the property in question
and a plaintiff’s right to relief therefore depends on superiority of title.” (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)); Edelstein v. Bank of New York Mellon, 286
P.3d 249, 260-61 (Nev. 2012) (explaining that Nevada law permits the severance
and independent transfer of deeds of trusts and promissory notes without impairing
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the loan beneficiary’s right to ultimately foreclose, and that MERS’s assignment of
the deed of trust along with the promissory note demonstrates valid transfer of both
instruments).
Dismissal of Jacobsen’s cancellation of assignment claim was proper
because Jacobsen failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the assignment was
defective. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Edelstein, 286 P.3d at 260-61.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by taking judicial notice of the
title documents. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir.
2001) (setting forth standard review and explaining the circumstances in which the
district court may take judicial notice of documents extraneous to the pleadings in
ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim).
Contrary to Jacobsen’s contention, the district court did not err by
considering a declaration of an HSBC employee in ruling on Jacobsen’s claim
under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 107.460, because HSBC moved for summary judgment in
the alternative and, in ruling on this claim, the district court applied the summary
judgment standard.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Jacobsen’s
complaint without leave to amend because amendment would have been futile.
See United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. Bldg. & Const. Trades Dep’t,
AFL–CIO, 770 F.3d 834, 845 (9th Cir. 2014) (setting forth standard of review and
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explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is not an abuse of discretion if
amendment would be futile).
AFFIRMED.
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