Kathleen Marchetti v. Superior Court of California

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 29 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KATHLEEN MARCHETTI, No. 16-16678
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:15-cv-05523-WHO
v.
MEMORANDUM*
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, a
public entity; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
William Horsley Orrick, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 7, 2017**
San Francisco, California
Before: M. SMITH and IKUTA, Circuit Judges, and MCAULIFFE,*** District
Judge.
Kathleen Marchetti appeals the district court’s dismissal of her suit asserting
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Steven J. McAuliffe, United States District Judge for
the District of New Hampshire, sitting by designation.
federal and state law claims arising from state court proceedings. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Marchetti’s complaint seeks, in substance, to vacate a default judgment
entered against her in the San Francisco Superior Court. Marchetti failed to appear
to contest a traffic citation related to operation of her unregistered vehicle. As a
result, her driver’s license was suspended and fines were assessed. She was
entitled to file a “Petition to Vacate Civil Assessment,” or seek a trial de novo on
the underlying traffic infraction, but only within twenty (20) days from the date on
which the Notice of Civil Assessment was mailed. See S.F. Super. Ct. Local Rule
17.1. She did not do so. Instead, she sought such review nearly eight months later.
However, the state court deemed the matter closed. Marchetti then sought relief in
federal court.
The district court dismissed Marchetti’s suit on a number of grounds,
including that it was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Rooker v. Fid.
Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462(1983). We review de novo a district court's dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). It is readily apparent
that if Marchetti’s federal suit is allowed to proceed, her complaint would function
as a de facto appeal of the prior state court judgment, in which she would raise
issues “inextricably intertwined” with that judgment. See Cooper v. Ramos, 704
2 16-16678
F.3d 772, 782 (9th Cir. 2012) (concluding that, where federal adjudication of a
claim “would impermissibly ‘undercut the state ruling’ on the same issues,”
plaintiff’s claim was “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s decision
(quoting Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003)); see also
Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 616 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred plaintiff’s claim because the alleged legal
injuries arose from the “state court’s purportedly erroneous judgment” and the
relief sought “would require the district court to determine that the state court’s
decision was wrong and thus void”).
Marchetti argues on appeal that her suit is not barred by Rooker-Feldman
because, inter alia, she is asserting a facial constitutional challenge to the limited
notice provisions of San Francisco Superior Court Local Rule 17.1. The
complaint, however, does not adequately allege a general, facial challenge to the
constitutionality of Local Rule 17.1. Instead, Marchetti’s complaint is focused on
the Superior Court’s application of Local Rule 17.1 to her case, and why that
application to her case denied her due process. That is, her claim is that the state
court got it wrong and she should be relieved of the default judgment’s effects.
Accordingly, the suit is barred by Rooker-Feldman.
AFFIRMED.
3 16-16678