Indirect Purchaser v. Toshiba Corporation

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
SEP 22 2021
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: CATHODE RAY TUBE (CRT) No. 20-15697
ANTITRUST LITIGATION,
______________________________ D.C. No. 4:07-cv-05944-JST
INDIRECT PURCHASER PLAINTIFFS,
MEMORANDUM*
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
TOSHIBA CORPORATION; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
v.
TYLER AYRES; et al.,
Movants-Appellants.
In re: CATHODE RAY TUBE (CRT) No. 20-15704
ANTITRUST LITIGATION,
______________________________ D.C. No. 4:07-cv-05944-JST
INDIRECT PURCHASER PLAINTIFFS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
v.
TOSHIBA CORPORATION; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
v.
ELEANOR LEWIS, Proposed Intervenor,
Movant-Appellant.
In re: CATHODE RAY TUBE (CRT) No. 20-16081
ANTITRUST LITIGATION,
______________________________ D.C. No. 4:07-cv-05944-JST
INDIRECT PURCHASER PLAINTIFFS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
TOSHIBA CORPORATION; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
v.
ANTHONY GIANASCA; et al.,
Movants-Appellants.
2
In re: CATHODE RAY TUBE (CRT) No. 20-16685
ANTITRUST LITIGATION,
______________________________ D.C. No. 4:07-cv-05944-JST
INDIRECT PURCHASER PLAINTIFFS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
TOSHIBA CORPORATION; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
v.
ELEANOR LEWIS, Proposed Intervenor,
Movant-Appellant.
In re: CATHODE RAY TUBE (CRT) No. 20-16686
ANTITRUST LITIGATION,
D.C. No. 4:07-cv-05944-JST
------------------------------
INDIRECT PURCHASER PLAINTIFFS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JEFF SPEAECT; et al.,
Objectors-Appellants,
3
v.
TOSHIBA CORPORATION; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
In re: CATHODE RAY TUBE (CRT) No. 20-16691
ANTITRUST LITIGATION,
______________________________ D.C. No. 4:07-cv-05944-JST
INDIRECT PURCHASER PLAINTIFFS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
TOSHIBA CORPORATION; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
v.
SCOTT A. CALDWELL, as administrator
of the Estate of Barbara Caldwell; et al.,
Movants-Appellants.
In re: CATHODE RAY TUBE (CRT) No. 20-16699
ANTITRUST LITIGATION,
______________________________ D.C. No. 4:07-cv-05944-JST
INDIRECT PURCHASER PLAINTIFFS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
4
v.
TOSHIBA CORPORATION; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
v.
TYLER AYRES; et al.,
Movants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Jon S. Tigar, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted July 28, 2021
San Francisco, California
Before: W. FLETCHER and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges, and KATZMANN,**
Judge.
Two sets of appeals have been presented to us. In one set, parties identified
as the Other Repealer States (ORS) and the Non-Repealer States (NRS) appellants
and purported settlement class member objectors appealed the district court’s
approval of amended settlements between the amended settlement class and
**
The Honorable Gary S. Katzmann, Judge for the United States Court
of International Trade, sitting by designation.
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Defendants.1 In the other set, the ORS and NRS appellants appealed the district
court’s earlier denial of their motions to intervene. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm the district court’s approval of the amended settlement
agreements, and we dismiss the NRS and ORS appeals of the denial of their
motions to intervene.
1. Appeal Nos. 20-16685, 20-16686, 20-16691, and 20-16699
To appeal a class settlement, appellants must demonstrate Article III
standing. Emps.-Teamsters Loc. Nos. 175 & 505 Pension Tr. Fund v. Anchor Cap.
Advisors, 498 F.3d 920, 923 (9th Cir. 2007). Separately and in addition, appellants
must establish “standing to appeal” including elements distinct from the
requirements of constitutional standing. See United States ex rel. Alexander
Volkhoff, LLC v. Janssen Pharmaceutica N.V., 945 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir.
2020). Under the standing to appeal doctrine as it has developed regarding
settlement approval, only parties to the settlement may appeal a dismissal by the
court of claims against settling defendants pursuant to the terms of the settlement
agreement. Waller v. Fin. Corp. of Am., 828 F.2d 579, 583 (9th Cir. 1987); see also
United States v. Kovall, 857 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2017) (articulating the
1
Defendants are a group of corporations that manufactured cathode ray tubes
(CRT). They include Phillips, Panasonic, Hitachi, Toshiba, Samsung, and
Thomson/TDA as well as their subsidiaries.
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general rule that only parties to a judgment may appeal it). The settlement
agreements at issue in this case provide for such a dismissal of the settling
defendants by the settlement class members, but they do not release claims by the
ORS or NRS appellants, so those appellants generally lack standing to object to the
settlement agreements and the dismissal of the claims against Defendants.
There is a narrow “exception to the general principle barring objections by
non-settling [individuals] to permit a non-settling [individual] to object where it
can demonstrate that it will sustain some formal legal prejudice as a result of the
settlement.” Waller, 828 F.2d at 583; see also Smith v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 421
F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir. 2005). “Formal legal prejudice” sufficient to allow a non-
settlement individual standing to appeal a settlement exists when a settlement
(1) “purports to strip [a party] of a legal claim or cause of action, an action for
indemnity or contribution for example,” or (2) “invalidates the contract rights of
one not participating in the settlement.” Waller, 828 F.2d at 583. A tactical
disadvantage is not legal prejudice. See Smith v. Lenches, 263 F.3d 972, 976 (9th
Cir. 2001); Waller, 828 F.2d at 584.
The ORS and NRS objectors have not suffered “formal legal prejudice” such
that they have standing to appeal the approval of the settlement agreements by the
district court. The amended settlements do “not release any of the ORS or NRS
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Subclasses’ claims.” The ORS and NRS objectors have not been stripped of a legal
claim or cause of action by the amended settlements. Waller, 828 F.2d at 583.
While the ORS and NRS objectors argue that the amended settlements and
resulting dismissal of the named plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants will weaken
their arguments to avoid Defendants’ statute of limitations defenses on the ground
that their claims “relate back” to the claims released by the settlement class
members, such a tactical disadvantage is not legal prejudice sufficient to create
standing to appeal. Smith, 263 F.3d at 976; Waller, 828 F.2d at 584. Similarly, they
contend that it will be difficult for them to accomplish service of process against
some of Defendants if they are not allowed to take advantage of their existing
presence in the district court action. That is not formal legal prejudice, either. The
ORS and NRS objectors lack standing to appeal the district court’s approval of the
current settlement agreements.
Along with the ORS and NRS objectors, purported settlement class members
appeal the district court’s striking of their objections to the settlement agreements.
This court reviews a district court’s decision to strike an objection for abuse of
discretion because issues of fact predominate. See United States v. Mateo-Mendez,
215 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The de novo standard applies when issues of
law predominate in the district court’s evidentiary analysis, and the abuse-of-
8
discretion standard applies when the inquiry is ‘essentially factual.’”). The district
court did not err in determining that the purported settlement class objectors
neither complied with the required procedures nor satisfied the requirements for
objections under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(5)(A). Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(e)(5)(A) (An “objection must state whether it applies only to the objector, to a
specific subset of the class, or to the entire class, and also state with specificity the
grounds for the objection.”). Having determined the objections were non-
compliant, the district court was within its discretion to strike them.
As there are no other objections to the amended settlements, we affirm the
amended settlements and remand to the district court for further proceedings,
including but not limited to, implementation of the settlements.
2. Appeals Nos. 20-15697, 20-15704 and 20-16081
Our affirmance of the amended settlement agreements moots the pending
appeals by the ORS and NRS appellants related to intervention in the district court.
To determine if an appeal of the denial of intervention is moot, we ask if “any
effectual relief whatever” is possible even “if we were to determine that the district
court erred in denying [] intervention.” United States v. Sprint Commc’n Inc., 855
F.3d 985, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). The ORS and NRS members seek to intervene into
the pending action against Defendants to strengthen their relation back arguments.
9
The approved amended settlements release Defendants from the suit at issue. There
is no longer an action against Defendants into which the ORS and NRS appellants
can intervene. We can grant no “effectual relief” to appellants even if we were to
reach the merits of the appeals and determine the district court erred. Id. We
dismiss the intervention appeals as moot.
Costs to be taxed against Appellants.
AFFIRMED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART, AND REMANDED
FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
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