Alice Hicks v. Thomas Skaar

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
SEP 23 2021
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ALICE HICKS, No. 20-35918
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:20-cv-05100-RJB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
THOMAS CIFFORD SKAAR; TRACEY
LEE SKAAR; PRINCETON PROPERTY
MANAGEMENT; EVERGREEN
VANCOUVER APARTMENTS, LLC,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Robert J. Bryan, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 22, 2021**
San Francisco, California
Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Alice Hicks appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in favor of
defendants Thomas Clifford Skaar, Tracey Lee Skaar, Princeton Property
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Management, and Evergreen Vancouver Apartments, LLC (collectively, the
Defendants) in her action alleging that the Defendants violated the Fair Housing
Act1 (FHA) by declining to renew her apartment lease. Reviewing the district
court’s summary judgment de novo,2 we affirm.
Hicks alleged that she is African American, and that the Defendants
discriminated against her on account of her race by declining to renew her lease.
See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)–(b); see also Ave. 6E Invs., LLC v. City of Yuma, 818 F.3d
493, 502 (9th Cir. 2016). Even assuming, without deciding, that Hicks established
a prima facie case of discrimination,3 summary judgment was nevertheless
appropriate because she failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that the
Defendants’ proffered reason for the nonrenewal—her repeated, unsubstantiated,
and racially-tinged complaints about her neighbors—was pretextual. See Harris,
183 F.3d at 1051. We are not persuaded by Hicks’ arguments to the contrary.
First, that the Defendants initially did not provide Hicks with a reason for
nonrenewal does not create a triable issue regarding pretext: a landlord needs no
cause for declining to renew a lease. See Wash. Rev. Code §§ 59.12.030(1),
1
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–19.
2
Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 1050–51 (9th Cir. 1999).
3
See Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 305 (9th Cir. 1997).
2
59.18.200(1)(a). Second, that Hicks did not receive lease violation notices during
her tenancy, while other tenants did, does not create a triable issue regarding
pretext. Hicks’ situation was materially different from those tenants: the
Defendants considered them to have violated the terms of their existing leases and
sent them notices thereof, but the Defendants have never asserted that Hicks
violated the terms of her lease. See Harris, 183 F.3d at 1053–54; cf. Earl v.
Nielsen Media Rsch., Inc., 658 F.3d 1108, 1113–14 (9th Cir. 2011).4 Because
Hicks “present[ed] no colorable evidence that would suggest that the [Defendants’]
proffered reason for” not renewing her lease “was a mere pretext for discriminating
against” African Americans, summary judgment was appropriate. Gamble, 104
F.3d at 306.5
In light of our conclusion, we need not and do not consider the alternative
ground relied upon by the district court for its judgment. See Lee v. City of Los
Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001); cf. Frost v. Symington, 197 F.3d 348,
358 (9th Cir. 1999).
AFFIRMED.
4
And whether Hicks’ conduct could have amounted to a lease violation is
beside the point.
5
We also reject Hicks’ argument that the district court erred in denying her
adequate time to serve interrogatories. Her contention that the district court
allowed her only two weeks to do so is not supported by the record.
3