United States v. Andres Garcia

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 13 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 21-50265
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
3:20-cr-03287-LAB-1
v.
ANDRES GARCIA, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 8, 2023**
Pasadena, California
Before: SCHROEDER, TALLMAN, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Andres Garcia appeals his conviction for importation of methamphetamine
in violation of 21 USC § 952. Defendant attempted to smuggle nearly 60 pounds
of methamphetamine into the United States from Mexico. A jury found Defendant
guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to 150 months in prison after finding the
safety valve provision from 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5) did not apply because of
Defendant’s perjury. The 150-month sentence represented a 210-month downward
departure from the sentencing guidelines.
Defendant raises three issues on appeal: (1) that Juror 28 should have been
struck for cause as actually or impliedly biased, (2) that the district court failed to
properly instruct the jury on aiding and abetting liability, and (3) that the district
court erroneously used statements made in the safety valve proffer to enhance
Defendant’s sentence.
1. The district court did not err in not excusing as actually or impliedly
biased prospective Juror 28 who had been intimidated while serving as a witness in
a prior, unrelated drug prosecution. The district court determined that Juror 28 was
unbiased based on both his statements and his demeanor. The court explained that
Juror 28 expressed concern that he would be followed out of the courtroom but
otherwise would be impartial. See United States v. Kechedzian, 902 F.3d 1023,
1027 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he determination of impartiality may be based on the
district court’s evaluation of a prospective juror’s demeanor.”). And when asked if
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he “[c]an fairly judge this case,” Juror 28 responded “I think I could.” See United
States v. Alexander, 48 F.3d 1477, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that district court
did not err by not excusing for cause where the prospective juror said that she
“believed” she could be impartial). In addition, unlike the cases Garcia cites, Juror
28 was not a victim of the crime for which Garcia was tried, cf. Kechedzian, 902
F.3d at 1026, and did not have a family member who had committed similar
crimes, cf. United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000).
As for implied bias, Juror 28’s experience as a witness in an unrelated drug
case nearly three decades earlier where someone followed him out of the
courtroom, making him uncomfortable, is not a “relationship between a
prospective juror and some aspect of the litigation” that makes it “highly unlikely
that the average person could remain impartial.” Fields v. Brown, 503 F.3d 755,
770–72 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Nor is there evidence that Juror 28 lied during
voir dire. See id. (stating that a second basis for striking a juror for implicit bias is
the juror’s “repeated lies in voir dire [that] imply that the juror concealed material
fact”). We see no manifest error or abuse of discretion where the determination of
impartiality is based on the district court’s evaluation of demeanor. Kechedzian,
902 F.3d at 1027.
2. Defendant did not object to the jury instructions before the district court,
so plain error review applies. United States v. Sanders, 421 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th
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Cir. 2005). District courts enjoy “substantial latitude” in construction of jury
instructions provided “that they fairly and adequately cover the issues presented.”
United States v. Luong, 965 F.3d 973, 986 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation
omitted). Aiding and abetting liability was not presented at trial because it only
pertained to a previously dismissed co-conspirator. Therefore, the district court did
not err when it did not sua sponte instruct on aiding and abetting liability. Further,
even though the verdict form contained language on aiding and abetting, the
district court did not plainly err in providing a verdict form with that irrelevant
language when, as here, the district court correctly instructed the jury orally and
Garcia did not explain how the irrelevant language affected his substantial rights.
United States v. Henry, 984 F.3d 1343, 1359 (9th Cir. 2021). And here, because
the jury was properly instructed, any error in the verdict form language was
harmless.
3. Plain error review applies to unpreserved claims of procedural sentencing
error. United States v. Anekwu, 695 F.3d 967, 989 (9th Cir. 2012). The district
court did not err in sentencing Appellant because (1) a district court is permitted to
consider information disclosed in a safety valve proffer when imposing a sentence,
and here (2) Defendant’s sentence was not improperly “enhanced” as a matter of
law when Defendant received a sentence of 150 months which represents a
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downward departure from the guideline range of 360 months to life. United States
v. Brown, 42 F.4th 1142 (9th Cir. 2022), forecloses Defendant’s argument.
AFFIRMED.
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