Ngoc Tran v. Kilolo Kijakazi

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
FEB 14 2023
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NGOC DIEM TRAN, No. 22-15438
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:20-cv-01714-MTL
v.
MEMORANDUM*
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Michael T. Liburdi, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 8, 2023**
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: GRABER, CLIFTON, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant Ngoc Diem Tran appeals the district court’s order
remanding her case to the Social Security Administration (SSA) for further
administrative proceedings. We review the district court’s decision de novo,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
except its decision to remand for further proceedings, which we review for abuse
of discretion. Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th
Cir. 2014). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. Because Tran’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be
expected to cause her alleged symptoms, the ALJ could reject Tran’s testimony
“regarding the severity of her symptoms only if he ma[de] specific findings stating
clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284
(9th Cir. 1996). In assessing a claimant’s credibility, ALJs “may consider, among
other factors, ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, inadequately explained
failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment, and the
claimant’s daily activities.” Rounds v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996,
1006 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We treat the
ALJ’s findings of fact as conclusive as long as they are supported by substantial
evidence. Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2019).
Here, the ALJ gave clear and convincing reasons for discounting Tran’s
testimony. Those reasons, which are supported by substantial evidence, include:
(1) improvements to Tran’s blood pressure after she took her medication correctly;
(2) her ability to ambulate without assistive devices; (3) improved extremity and
grip strength, range of motion, and endurance, as shown in physical therapy
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records; and (4) inconsistencies between her accounts of pain and her providers’
observations. The ALJ thus properly discounted Tran’s symptom testimony.
2. The district court concluded that the ALJ committed reversible error by:
(1) improperly discounting the testimony of Tran’s treating physician, Dr. Pandey;
(2) improperly discounting lay witness testimony from Tran’s sister and friend; and
(3) posing an incomplete hypothetical to the vocational expert (VE) due to errors
(1) and (2). On those grounds, the district court remanded. Because the Acting
Commissioner does not contest the district court’s conclusion, the remaining issue
on appeal is Tran’s argument that the court abused its discretion by remanding for
further administrative proceedings instead of directing an award of benefits.
In evaluating whether the district court abused its discretion, we ask: (1)
whether the “ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting
evidence,” Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1100–01 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted); and (2) “whether the record has been fully developed, whether there are
outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of disability can be
made, and whether further administrative proceedings would be useful,” id. at 1101(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). If no outstanding issues remain
and further proceedings would not be useful, the district court has the discretion to
find the “relevant testimony credible as a matter of law.” Id.3
The district court concluded that further administrative proceedings would
“allow the ALJ to reassess the improperly discounted testimony and incorporate it,
as necessary, into the hypothetical posed to the vocational expert.” Tran contends
that the VE already considered the restrictions described by Dr. Pandey and
concludes, on this ground, that the ALJ would be required to find her disabled.
But, as the district court correctly observed, the ALJ’s erroneous decision to
discount Dr. Pandey’s opinion depended on the ALJ’s mistake as it relates to the
doctor’s examination of Tran and the ALJ’s failure to address the doctor’s
complete opinion. In light of the other evidence in the record regarding Tran’s
ability to work, correcting those errors would not necessarily establish that Tran
was disabled. See Strauss v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 635 F.3d 1135, 1138
(9th Cir. 2011) (“A claimant is not entitled to benefits under the statute unless the
claimant is, in fact, disabled, no matter how egregious the ALJ’s errors may be.”).
Because there are outstanding issues for the SSA to resolve on remand, the district
court did not abuse its discretion by remanding for further administrative
proceedings.
AFFIRMED.
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