United States v. Luis Valdez

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAY 26 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 14-50251
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:13-cr-00849-DSF-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
LUIS VALDEZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 2, 2016**
Pasadena, California
Before: PREGERSON, BYBEE, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Luis Valdez appeals his sentence imposed following his guilty plea to illegal
re-entry after removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
1. The district court did not plainly err by failing to consider Valdez’s
arguments regarding deterrence. See United States v. Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d
1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010). The district court noted, “I appreciate Mr. Brown’s
efforts to present the purported evidence that there’s no relationship between the
length of a sentence and general or specific deterrence.” The district court went
further and even agreed with the argument, as applied to Valdez, by stating that
Valdez’s previous convictions had not deterred him from re-entering. Having
addressed Valdez’s argument regarding deterrence, the district court proceeded to
base its decision on other factors. The court found that a longer sentence would
“more appropriately reflect the seriousness of the offense” and “will do more to
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.”
2. The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing an upward
variance, because the district court based its decision on the factors enumerated
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). After reciting Valdez’s criminal history, the district
court stated that “[t]o the extent that the enhancement under section 2L1.2 is meant
to reflect the seriousness of the crime, it does not adequately do so for this
offense.” The court noted that, although Valdez’s kidnaping offense was not
categorically a crime of violence, the conduct underlying the offense had been
violent. The district court concluded that “[t]herefore, the nature and circumstances
2
of the offense, along with the other factors I described, indicate an above-guideline
sentence is appropriate.”
Valdez argues his sentence was unreasonable, because the district court did
not adequately consider his argument that he had returned due to his wife’s illness.
Contrary to Valdez’s assertion, the district court considered and responded to this
argument, but found it unpersuasive. The district court noted that Valdez’s wife
was traveling to Mexico for treatment and asked Valdez why he needed to come to
the United States when his wife was receiving treatment in Mexico. Valdez
responded that he came to take care of his daughters if anything were to happen to
his wife. The court responded by stating that Valdez’s multiple previous illegal re-
entries had nothing to do with his wife’s illness, because she had been diagnosed
after the earlier illegal re-entries. The court also noted that this was not a situation
where a shorter sentence would allow Valdez to care for his children, because
Valdez would not be able to re-enter the United States after being released.
Valdez also argues the district court improperly relied on the violent nature
of his kidnaping conviction, because Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276
(2013), prohibits a district court from examining facts outside the conviction
documents in determining whether the offense was a crime of violence. However,
this prohibition does not apply to a district court’s sentencing determination in
3
general. Congress has directed that “‘[n]o limitation . . . be placed on the
information concerning the background, character, and conduct’ of a defendant that
a district court may ‘receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an
appropriate sentence.’” Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 490–91 (2011)
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3661) (alteration in original). Thus, it was permissible for the
district court to take into account the violent nature of Valdez’s kidnaping offense
in determining the sentence duration, even though the district court did not find the
offense was categorically a crime of violence.
3. We decline to address Valdez’s claim that he received ineffective assistance
of counsel. “Challenge by way of a habeas proceeding is preferable because it
permits the defendant to develop a record as to what counsel did, why it was done,
and what, if any, prejudice resulted.” United States v. McGowan, 668 F.3d 601,
605 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Laughlin, 933 F.2d 786, 788–89 (9th
Cir. 1991)). Valdez’s representation was not “so inadequate” as to warrant an
exception from this general rule. See id. Although Valdez’s counsel did not include
evidence or argument about Valdez’s father, Valdez testified before the court that
he had re-entered both to see his wife and his father. Thus, the court was aware that
Valdez’s father was a reason for Valdez’s decision to re-enter. Valdez’s counsel
was present when Valdez spoke to the court, and so it is likely that counsel’s
4
omission was strategic rather than a result of deficient performance. This
conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Valdez’s counsel gave ample evidence and
argument regarding Valdez’s purpose of re-entering to see his wife.
4. The district court did not plainly err by imposing the gang-related conditions
of supervised release. See United States v. Johnson, 626 F.3d 1085, 1088–89 (9th
Cir. 2010) (reviewing supervised release conditions for plain error where the
defendant failed to object to the conditions below). Under United States v.
Fernandez, gang-related tattoos “tend[] to prove gang membership.” 388 F.3d
1199, 1245–46 (9th Cir. 2004). Although Valdez denied any gang involvement, he
did not offer any other explanation for having a Southside gang tattoo. Because the
preponderance of the evidence standard applies to the imposition of supervised
release conditions, United States v. Collins, 684 F.3d 873, 888–89 (9th Cir. 2012),
we find that the district court did not err in imposing the gang-related conditions of
supervised release.
5. The district court did not engage in impermissible double counting. Valdez
concedes this point and raises it here only to preserve it for further review.
AFFIRMED.
5