Rafael Miranda v. Daron Wyatt

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 22 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RAFAEL GARCIA MIRANDA and OLGA No. 15-55716
MARTHA GARCIA,
D.C. No.
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 8:13-cv-01826-JVS-DFM
v.
MEMORANDUM *
DARON WYATT,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
James V. Selna, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 10, 2017
Pasadena, California
Before: SCHROEDER and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges, and GLEASON,** District
Judge.
Rafael Garcia Miranda and Olga Martha Garcia (collectively “Plaintiffs”)
appeal the district court’s decision denying Plaintiffs’ request to give an adverse
inference jury instruction. A district court’s refusal to give an adverse inference
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Sharon L. Gleason, United States District Judge for
the District of Alaska, sitting by designation.
jury instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Fries, 781
F.3d 1137, 1146 (9th Cir. 2015). “A district court abuses its discretion if it does
not apply the correct law or if it rests its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of
material fact.” Jeff D. v. Otter, 643 F.3d 278, 283 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation
omitted). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
The district court’s denial of an adverse inference jury instruction was based
on neither an incorrect application of the law nor a clearly erroneous finding of
material fact. The parties agree that Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge
Financial Corp., 306 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2002), provides an appropriate test for
determining when an adverse inference instruction can be given. Though the
district court concluded that an adverse inference jury instruction was permissible,
the district court was not legally required to issue such an instruction. The district
court explained that Plaintiffs were permitted to argue their position to the jury,
that there was nothing “maligned” in the erasure of the DVD, and that the jury was
permitted to make its own conclusions about the deletion of the video. The
decision to give an adverse inference jury instruction is made on a case-by-case
basis and “commensurate to the spoliating party’s motive or degree of fault in
destroying the evidence.” Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 888 F. Supp. 2d 976,
992–93 (N.D. Cal. 2012); see also Residential Funding, 306 F.3d at 108. The
district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in concluding that an adverse
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inference instruction was inappropriate under the factual circumstances of this
case. See Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 363,
368 (9th Cir. 1992) (recognizing a district court’s “broad discretion to make
discovery and evidentiary rulings conducive to the conduct of a fair and orderly
trial” (citation omitted)).
AFFIRMED.
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