Amparo Rivas-Bahena v. Loretta E. Lynch

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION AUG 02 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AMPARO RIVAS-BAHENA, AKA Maria No. 14-71931
Garcia Domingez, AKA Amparo Rivas,
AKA Barbara Salazar, Agency No. A077-206-970
Petitioner,
MEMORANDUM*
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted July 26, 2016**
Before: SCHROEDER, CANBY, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Amparo Rivas-Bahena, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review
of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing her appeal from an
immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision finding her removable and denying her
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
applications for relief. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We
review de novo questions of law and review for substantial evidence the agency’s
findings of fact. Blanco v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 714, 718 (9th Cir. 2008). We deny
in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Rivas-Bahena
is inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) and ineligible to adjust status,
where the record indicates she made a false claim to United States citizenship to
gain entry to the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)(2) (eligibility); Pichardo v.
INS, 216 F.3d 1198, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000) (false claim to United States citizenship
is a “non-waivable ground of inadmissibility” under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)).
Rivas-Bahena’s contention that she attempted to timely recant her false claim of
citizenship is belied by the record. See Valadez-Munoz v. Holder, 623 F.3d 1304,
1310 (9th Cir. 2010) (where an applicant made the retraction only after being
confronted with evidence of misrepresentation, the applicant cannot take advantage
of the timely recantation doctrine). Accordingly, we do not reach Rivas-Bahena’s
contentions regarding hardship.
Rivas-Bahena failed to exhaust her contention that the IJ erred in not
adjourning removal proceedings to allow for processing of the I-130 visa petition
filed on Rivas-Bahena’s behalf by her husband. See Tijani v. Holder, 628 F.3d
2 14-71931
1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We lack jurisdiction to review legal claims not
presented in an alien’s administrative proceedings before the BIA.”).
Rivas-Bahena does not challenge the BIA’s dispositive determination that
she was unable to establish the good moral character required for cancellation of
removal because she provided false testimony to gain admission to the United
States. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(f)(6); 1229b(b)(1)(B). Accordingly, we do not reach
Rivas-Bahena’s contention regarding the continuous physical presence required for
cancellation of removal.
We lack jurisdiction to review Rivas-Bahena’s unexhausted contention that
her asylum application was not untimely because circumstances in Mexico have
changed for women. See Tijani, 628 F.3d at 1080.
Rivas-Bahena’s claim to membership in a gender-based particular social
group was raised for the first time in briefing before the BIA, and the BIA deemed
the claim waived and declined to address it further. Rivas-Bahena does not raise,
and therefore has waived, any challenge to the agency’s waiver determination. See
id. (a petitioner waives an issue by failing to raise it in the opening brief).
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Rivas-Bahena
failed to establish past persecution or a clear probability of future persecution on
account of a protected ground. See Ramirez-Munoz v. Lynch, 816 F.3d 1226,
3 14-71931
1228-29 (9th Cir. 2016); Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 741 (9th Cir.
2009) (under the REAL ID Act, “to demonstrate that a protected ground was ‘at
least one central reason’ for persecution, an applicant must prove that such ground
was a cause of the persecutors’ acts”). Accordingly, Rivas-Bahena’s withholding
of removal claim fails. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1011 (9th Cir. 2010).
Finally, substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of
Convention Against Torture relief on the ground that Rivas-Bahena failed to
demonstrate it is more likely than not that she would be tortured by or with the
consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to Mexico. See Silaya v.
Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2008).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
4 14-71931