United States v. Roman Rosas-Martinez

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JAN 08 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 12-30358
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:11-cr-00344-RAJ-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ROMAN ROSAS-MARTINEZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Richard A. Jones, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 2, 2013
Seattle, Washington
Before: TALLMAN and BEA, Circuit Judges, and MURPHY, District Judge.**
Roman Rosas-Martinez appeals his convictions for conspiracy to distribute
methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, and
possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. We affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Stephen Joseph Murphy, III, United States District
Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.
1. A district court is required to conduct an in camera examination of
documents for exculpatory material only if a defendant can make some showing
that such material will be found. United States v. Henke, 222 F.3d 633, 642-43
(9th Cir. 2000). Here, Rosas-Martinez put forth no evidence or showing that an
examination of the file would have revealed exculpatory or impeachment material.
The district court accordingly had no duty to examine the file, and did not err in
declining to do so.
2. The government sought to introduce several recordings of conversations
between Rosas-Martinez and the confidential informant, made in the Spanish
language. Before trial, the district court admitted the recordings, the full translated
transcripts, and abbreviated translated transcripts. The abbreviated transcripts were
read to the jury during the trial. During deliberations, the jury requested the full
transcript for recording 27; the district court declined over Rosas-Martinez's
objections, and read back only the abbreviated transcript for that recording that had
been originally read during the trial.
The district court erred by not providing a read back of the full transcript.
As the district court initially admitted the full recording and the full transcript into
evidence, it was an abuse of discretion not to provide the transcript to the jury upon
its request. See generally United States v. De Rodriguez, 508 F.2d 411, 412 (9th
2
Cir. 1974); cf. United States v. Franco, 136 F.3d 622, 628 (9th Cir. 1998)
(discussing translated transcripts of foreign language conversations). But an
examination of the full transcript shows that it is frequently inculpatory, portraying
Rosas-Martinez as the driving force behind the proposed methamphetamine deal.
Its admission would not have materially affected the verdict, see generally United
States v. Seschillie, 310 F.3d 1208, 1214 (9th Cir. 2002) (standard for harmless
error), and therefore, the error was harmless.
3. Voir dire limitations are reversible error only if "the procedure used for
testing does not create any reasonable assurances that prejudice would be
discovered if present." United States v. Patterson, 648 F.2d 625, 630 (9th Cir.
1981). Here, Rosas-Martinez's counsel failed to use the full twenty minutes
initially allotted, and did not request additional time. Additionally, a post-trial
examination of the jury foreman revealed he was unaware of his daughter’s
personal connection with an Assistant U.S. Attorney until after the trial. Rosas-
Martinez cannot show he could have discovered the connection during voir dire
even with additional time, or that he was prejudiced.
4. The district court did not err in admitting a police detective as an expert
witness who testified to a nexus between drug trafficking and the carrying of
firearms. See United States v. Freeman, 498 F.3d 893, 906 (9th Cir. 2007) (law
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enforcement officers permitted to testify as expert witnesses). An examination of
the detective's testimony reveals he did not exceed the permissible bounds of an
expert witness, nor made any impermissible inferences or invade the fact-finding
province of the jury. See, e.g., United States v. Anchrum, 590 F.3d 795, 804 (9th
Cir. 2009).
5. The district court admitted evidence that Rosas-Martinez had sold a shotgun
to the confidential informant during one of their initial meetings. The evidence of
the shotgun sale was a necessary prerequisite for the jury to understand the
evolving business relationship between Rosas-Martinez and the confidential
informant, see e.g., United States v. Williams, 989 F.2d 1061, 1070 (9th Cir. 1993),
and therefore necessary "to permit the prosecutor to offer a coherent and
comprehensible story regarding the commission of the crime." United States v.
Beckman, 298 F.3d 788, 794 (9th Cir. 2002). The district court accordingly did not
abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence as "inextricably intertwined."
6. The "open door" doctrine is limited to admitting past hearsay documents or
statements that "clarify or provide context to the inconsistent statements, such that
they become relevant and thus admissible for a purpose other than to prove the
truth of the matters asserted therein." United States v. Collicott, 92 F.3d 973, 981
(9th Cir. 1996). After examining the record, it is clear that Rosas' response was not
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taken out of context, and admission of the document would only have improperly
bolstered Rosas' previous testimony. Accordingly, there were no grounds under
the "open door" doctrine to admit the document, and the district court did not err in
refusing to do so. Moreover, Rosas-Martinez cannot show that the admission of
statements from the document would have affected the verdict in light of the
overwhelming physical and testimonial evidence of his guilt. Any error would
have been harmless.
AFFIRMED.
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