United States v. Brian Caputo

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 20 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 16-10497
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
1:14-cr-00041-LJO-SKO-1
v.
BRIAN CAPUTO, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Lawrence J. O'Neill, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 15, 2019**
San Francisco, California
Before: WALLACE, IKUTA, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Brian Caputo pleaded guilty to receiving or distributing child pornography,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2). The district court sentenced him to 15 years
imprisonment, to be followed by 15 years of supervised release. He appeals from
the judgment and sentence. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
affirm.
1. On de novo review, we conclude that Caputo knowingly and voluntarily
entered into the plea agreement. See United States v. Timbana, 222 F.3d 688, 701
(9th Cir. 2000). During the plea colloquy, Caputo responded that he understood
the terms of the agreement and the consequences of pleading guilty. See United
States v. Briggs, 623 F.3d 724, 728 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We take the district court’s
detailed colloquy with [the defendant] as strong evidence that [he] understood the
meaning of his actions”). Caputo’s courtroom demeanor and actions also indicate
sufficient mental comprehension. He was able to remember events from prior
hearings, demonstrating awareness of the general proceedings. He testified clearly
and articulately, from which the district court made credibility determinations. He
understood and was able to respond rationally to questions. Caputo submitted
several articulate letters. In fact, the district court described Caputo’s testimony at
the suppression hearing as “very precise [and] detailed” as to “what happened,
what was said, who said it, who did what, who didn’t do what.” Nowhere is it
suggested that Caputo displayed unusual conduct or mannerisms during any part of
the trial proceedings.
Furthermore, defense counsel stated multiple times that Caputo understood
the nature of the trial proceedings. At the detention hearing, counsel stated,
“having talked to Mr. Caputo and his mother and some of his family members, he
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knows what is going on . . . he knows, he understands what is going on.” At the
sentencing, counsel stated that, “in terms of [Caputo’s] ability to understand the
proceedings, he was able to go through the Presentence Report with [counsel], he
asked appropriate questions, and appeared to understand [counsel’s] answers.”
This is telling because “a defendant’s counsel is in the best position to evaluate a
client’s comprehension of the proceedings.” Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714, 718
(9th Cir. 1991).
There is no question that Caputo suffers from neurological conditions, of
which the district court was well aware. However, the evidence indicates that
Caputo knowingly and voluntarily entered into the plea agreement.
2. Because Caputo knowingly and voluntarily entered into the plea
agreement, the appeal waiver included therein is valid. He has waived his right to
challenge the police officers’ search and seizure. See United States v. Medina-
Carrasco, 815 F.3d 457, 462 (9th Cir. 2016) (enforcing “a valid waiver even if the
claims that could have been made on appeal absent that waiver appear meritorious,
because ‘[t]he whole point of a waiver . . . is the relinquishment of claims
regardless of their merit’” (quoting United States v. Nguyen, 235 F.3d 1179, 1184
(9th Cir. 2000))).
3. For the first time, Caputo challenges on appeal the district court’s failure
to order a competency hearing sua sponte, so we review for plain error. United
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States v. Marks, 530 F.3d 799, 814 (9th Cir. 2008).1 We may exercise our
discretion to correct a district court on plain error review if: (1) the district court
erred; (2) the error was plain; (3) the error affects substantial rights; and (4) the
error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” United States v. Depue, 912 F.3d 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 2019) (en
banc). “Due process requires a trial court to hold a competency hearing sua sponte
whenever the evidence before it raises a reasonable doubt whether a defendant is
mentally competent.” Id. (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 986
(9th Cir. 2007)). We review “to see if the evidence of incompetence was such that
a reasonable judge would be expected to experience a genuine doubt respecting the
defendant’s competence.” Id. (quoting Mitchell, 502 F.3d at 986). As discussed,
evidence indicates that Caputo understood the nature of the proceedings and
intelligently participated. See United States v. Garza, 751 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th
Cir. 2014) (concluding that “[e]ven a mentally deranged defendant is out of luck if
there is no indication that he failed to understand or assist in his criminal
proceedings”). “And [Caputo] was, in fact, able to assist in his defense. He
testified. He allocuted. And his counsel had no complaints.” Id. at 1137; see also
1
The government does not argue, so we do not consider, whether the appellate
waiver in Caputo’s plea agreement, once determined to be valid and enforceable,
precludes a challenge to the district court’s decision not to order a competency
hearing sua sponte.
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id. (affirming a decision not to hold a sua sponte competency hearing and stating
that the judgment of “an experienced trial judge with a far better vantage point than
ours . . . give[s] us confidence in our conclusion”). Accordingly, the district court
did not plainly err in failing to order a competency hearing sua sponte.
AFFIRMED.
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