United States v. Jose Helguera-Del Rio

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 31 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 17-30175
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 3:16-cr-00110-BR-2
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JOSE JOEL HELGUERA-DEL RIO,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Anna J. Brown, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 17, 2019
Portland, Oregon
Before: N.R. SMITH and WATFORD, Circuit Judges, and SELNA,** District
Judge.
Jose Helguera-Del Rio (“Helguera”) challenges his convictions for
conspiracy to possess and distribute methamphetamine and cocaine, possession
with intent to distribute methamphetamine and cocaine, and possession of a
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable James V. Selna, United States District Judge for the
Central District of California, sitting by designation.
Page 2 of 6
firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. We affirm.
1. The district court properly denied Helguera’s motion to suppress the
drugs found in the minivan. Helguera was in the passenger seat while his wife’s
cousin, Alberto Martinez (“Martinez”), drove. A police officer lawfully stopped
them and, after observing a firearm in the glove box, took the reasonable step of
removing them both from the minivan, leaving the passenger door open. Because
the passenger door was open and the officer was “in a place where he ha[d] a right
to be,” the officer’s naked-eye observation of a white substance believed to be drug
residue on a dollar bill in the passenger door pocket was not a search. See United
States v. Head, 783 F.2d 1422, 1426 (9th Cir. 1986). That observation in turn gave
the officer probable cause to search the rest of the vehicle for drugs. See Wyoming
v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 307 (1999).
2. Helguera raises three instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct
during closing argument. Because he did not object at trial, we review for plain
error. “We may reverse if: (1) there was error; (2) it was plain; (3) it affected the
defendant’s substantial rights; and (4) viewed in the context of the entire trial, the
impropriety seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.” United States v. Alcantara-Castillo, 788 F.3d 1186, 1190–
91 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The government concedes that the prosecutor committed misconduct by
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vouching for the credibility of Martinez’s testimony, telling the jury that “it just
sounded absolutely so truthful to me.” The government further concedes that the
prosecutor improperly argued propensity evidence by telling the jury that Helguera
had the “lifestyle” of a drug trafficker. Finally, Helguera contends that the
prosecutor also violated a stipulation not to “argue to the jury that they should infer
. . . a link” between the drug residue in the passenger door compartment and the
drugs found in the back of the van. We do not think any of these instances of
misconduct rises to the level of plain error because, even considered collectively,
they did not affect Helguera’s substantial rights.
First, the prosecutor ameliorated the vouching error himself, telling the jury
that “[e]ven though I say that Mr. Martinez sounded believable to me, that doesn’t
matter a lick either.” Second, the trial court instructed the jurors that the lawyers’
closing arguments are not evidence and that they “should examine the testimony of
Mr. Martinez with greater caution than that of other witnesses.” Even in cases of
prosecutorial misconduct, “an instruction carries more weight than an argument.”
United States v. Begay, 673 F.3d 1038, 1046 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc); see also
Fields v. Brown, 503 F.3d 755, 782 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (“We presume that
jurors follow the instructions.”).
Second, the jury heard plenty of evidence apart from Mr. Martinez’s
testimony to suggest that Helguera was a knowing participant in a drug trafficking
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operation rather than an unwitting bystander. Evidence showed that Helguera and
Martinez drove for about 32 hours with little rest, an itinerary consistent with drug
trafficking. When he arrived in Southern California, Helguera texted the words
“California Budget Motel” to an unknown person, suggesting a clandestine
meeting. When the police questioned him about the drugs found in the car,
Helguera told them repeatedly that the drugs were not his and that he had not seen
them, but he conspicuously avoided answering whether he had been paid to deliver
the drugs and whether he knew the drugs were there. He was also carrying over
$3,000 in cash. This evidence, independent of the effect of any misconduct,
strongly suggested that Helguera was a knowing participant in a drug trafficking
conspiracy.
We acknowledge that, as the dissent points out, the prosecution produced
less evidence (aside from Martinez’s testimony) that tends to directly show that
Helguera knowingly possessed the firearm, as alleged in Count 4. However, as
noted above, even without Martinez’s testimony, the trial evidence established that
the firearm was found in the glovebox, mere inches from where Helguera was
sitting when stopped by law enforcement. Even without Martinez’s testimony, the
trial evidence also demonstrated that Helguera provided the vehicle, purchased and
possessed the white cell phone used to arrange the transaction, and carried the
cash. With or without Martinez’s testimony the jury could have inferred from this
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circumstantial evidence that Helguera was aware of the firearm. Lastly, because
the jury was properly instructed and because the prosecutor’s remarks were
isolated, and the vouching remarks were corrected by the prosecutor himself, we
do not find that Helguera’s substantial rights were affected with regards to Count
4.1
3. The district court correctly denied Helguera’s motion for a judgment of
acquittal with respect to Count 4, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Helguera raised this argument in his
motion for judgment of acquittal, which was made following the close of the
government’s case, and he did not renew that motion after the close of evidence.
We “may review an unrenewed motion for judgment of acquittal, but only to
prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice, or for plain error.” United States v.
Alvarez-Valenzuela, 231 F.3d 1198, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000). We will “not reverse in
the absence of a clear showing of insufficiency,” id., and Helguera cannot show
clear insufficiency here. A rational trier of fact could have found beyond a
reasonable doubt, see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), that the
object in the glove compartment was a “firearm,” that is, a “weapon . . . which will
1
Moreover, even if these errors did affect Helguera’s substantial rights regarding
Count 4, we do not find that these errors are the kind of error that should be
noticed under the final, discretionary prong of the plain error test. See United
States v. Perez, 116 F.3d 840, 846 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
Page 6 of 6
or is designed to . . . expel a projectile by the action of an explosive.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 921(a)(3); cf. United States v. Westerdahl, 945 F.2d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 1991)
(“Possession of a toy or replica gun cannot sustain a conviction under
§ 924(c).”). In this case, the gun was admitted into evidence, so the jury could
have examined it. The video of the traffic stop also showed the officer emptying
bullets from the gun.2 The jury also heard testimony that the object was a .45
caliber gun. That evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to conclude that the
“object” was a firearm designed to expel a projectile.
4. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Helguera
a “minor participant” adjustment. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). The district court
reasoned that the “extraordinary quantity” of drugs that Helguera possessed
showed “that he was in a position of trust within the conspiracy.” Our circuit has
already approved of that reasoning. See United States v. Rodriguez-Castro, 641
F.3d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 2011).
AFFIRMED.
2
It isn’t clear from the record that this particular portion of the video was played
for the jury during trial. However, the full video was entered into evidence and
was available for the jury’s review during its deliberations.
FILED
United States v. Helguera-Del Rio, No. 17-30175 MAY 31 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
WATFORD, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part: U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
I would reverse Helguera’s conviction for possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. As the government has conceded, the
prosecutor improperly vouched for Martinez’s credibility when he assured the jury
that Martinez’s testimony “just sounded absolutely so truthful to me.”
Our disposition recounts the corroborating evidence that suffices to sustain
Helguera’s convictions for conspiracy and drug possession on plain error review.
As to the firearm charge, however, there is no evidence corroborating Martinez’s
testimony that Helguera knew about the gun. Indeed, if anything, the fact that
Helguera opened the glove box in front of a police officer, thereby revealing the
contraband gun, casts doubt on Martinez’s testimony that Helguera had placed the
gun there just minutes before.
With the evidence on this point shaky at best, everything turned on
Martinez’s credibility. “We have repeatedly reversed convictions for plain error in
cases in which witness credibility was paramount and the prosecutor sought to
bolster critical testimony through improper conduct.” United States v. Alcantara-
Castillo, 788 F.3d 1186, 1196 (9th Cir. 2015). I would do so here.