Blacktail Mountain Ranch Co. v. Linda Jonas

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 30 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BLACKTAIL MOUNTAIN RANCH CO., No. 14-35302
LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability
Company; EDWIN RITTER JONAS, III, D.C. No. 9:13-cv-00090-DWM
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
MEMORANDUM*
v.
LINDA B. JONAS; QUENTIN M.
RHOADES; CRAIG MUNGAS;
SULLIVAN, TABARACCI &
RHOADES, P.C., a Professional
Corporation; JAMES DORMER;
GARDNER AUCTION CO. INC.;
ROBERT D. ERICKSON; STEVE
STELLING, DBA Stelling & Associates;
HIGH COUNTRY MARKETING, LLC,
DBA Montana Livestock Auction, Inc.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Donald W. Molloy, Senior District Judge, Presiding
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Submitted April 10, 2015**
Seattle Washington
Before: HAWKINS, RAWLINSON, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Appellants Edwin Jonas (Jonas) and his company, Blacktail Mountain
Ranch Co. (Blacktail Mountain) (collectively, Plaintiffs), appeal from the district
court’s dismissal of their action against Jonas’ former wife Linda Jonas (Linda),
the attorneys who represented her (collectively, the Attorney Defendants), the
state-court appointed receiver, and the receiver’s agents (collectively, the Receiver
Defendants).
This case involves challenges to the validity and enforceability of a New
Jersey judgment against Jonas for unpaid alimony and child support to Linda,
among other obligations. Linda subsequently domesticated her judgment in
Montana state court.
1. The district court did not abuse its discretion in taking judicial notice
of the Montana Supreme Court decisions. See Skilstaf, Inc. v. CVS Caremark
Corp., 669 F.3d 1005, 1016 n.9 (9th Cir. 2012). Moreover, the district court did
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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not fail to take judicial notice of the New Jersey documents submitted by Plaintiffs,
and gave full faith and credit to the New Jersey judgment.
2. The district court acted within its discretion in denying Plaintiffs’
motion to disqualify Defendants’ counsel as advocates who were likely to be
necessary witnesses. In any event, Plaintiffs lacked standing to move for
disqualification because they were not clients or former clients of Defendants’
counsel. See De Dios v. Int’l Realty & Investments, 641 F.3d 1071, 1077 (9th Cir.
2011).
3. The district court did not abuse its discretion in setting aside for good
cause the clerk’s entry of default against Linda. The district court found that (1)
reopening the default judgment would not prejudice Plaintiffs, given the early
stage of the litigation; (2) Linda had meritorious defenses; and (3) she had not
engaged in culpable conduct that led to the default. See United States v. Signed
Personal Check No. 730 of Yubran S. Mesle, 615 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010).
4. The district court properly dismissed the claims against the Receiver
Defendants on the grounds of absolute judicial immunity. Plaintiffs’ argument that
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the Receiver Defendants were not entitled to immunity because the appointing
judge was not entitled to judicial immunity fails. Because the appointing judge had
subject matter jurisdiction over Linda’s domestication case, he did not act in the
“clear absence of all jurisdiction” that would deprive him of judicial immunity,
Miller v. Davis, 521 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); Mont.
Const. art. VII, § 4 (conferring jurisdiction on the state district court); see also
Mont. Code Ann. § 3-5-302 (same). Because the appointing judge was entitled to
absolute judicial immunity, so too were the Receiver Defendants. See New Alaska
Dev. Corp. v. Guetschow, 869 F.2d 1298, 1302-03 (9th Cir. 1989).
5. The district court properly dismissed the claims against Linda and the
Attorney Defendants on the grounds of collateral estoppel and res judicata. See
Planned Parenthood of Montana v. State, 342 P.3d 684, 686 (Mont. 2015). The
issues in both cases involve the validity and enforceability of the New Jersey
judgment. There was a final judgment on the merits in the Montana state courts.
Jonas and Blacktail Mountain were parties to or in privity with a party to the prior
action. See Wamsley v. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 178 P.3d 102, 114 (Mont. 2008).
Jonas was afforded a “full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue.” Planned
Parenthood, 342 P.3d at 686.
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Res judicata bars Plaintiffs’ claims against the Attorney Defendants, as these
claims could have been raised in the Montana state court litigation. See Gibbs v.
Altenhofen, 330 P.3d 458, 463 (Mont. 2014).
Because the district court properly dismissed the action on the basis of
absolute judicial immunity, collateral estoppel, and res judicata, we need not
address its dismissal on the basis of the Rooker-Feldman1 doctrine.
AFFIRMED.
1
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and District of
Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
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