Ashenafi Aberha v. Eric Delafontaine

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 23 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ASHENAFI G. ABERHA, No. 22-15282
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
3:19-cv-00606-MMD-CSD
v.
ERIC DELAFONTAINE, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant,
and
NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS; DIRECTOR, Nevada
Department of Corrections; W. GITTERRE;
JAMES DZURENDA; SUNDAY; G. T.
DAVIS,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Miranda M. Du, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 15, 2023**
San Francisco, California
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Before: WARDLAW, NGUYEN, and KOH, Circuit Judges.
Correctional officer Eric Delafontaine appeals the district court’s order
denying him qualified immunity from inmate Ashenafi Aberha’s suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, in which Aberha claims that Delafontaine failed to protect him
from sexual assaults allegedly committed by Aberha’s cellmate. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review the district court’s denial of qualified
immunity “to the extent that it turns on an issue of law.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472
U.S. 511, 530 (1985). Reviewing such legal issues de novo, see Stewart v. Aranas,
32 F.4th 1192, 1195 (9th Cir. 2022), we affirm in part and dismiss in part.
“An official sued under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity unless it is
shown that: (1) the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the
right was ‘clearly established’ at the time the violation occurred.” Manriquez v.
Ensley, 46 F.4th 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S.
765, 778 (2014)). “The failure of prison officials to protect inmates from attacks
by other inmates may rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation when: (1)
the deprivation alleged is ‘objectively, sufficiently serious’ and (2) the prison
officials had a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind,’ acting with deliberate
indifference.” Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)).
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1. In Delafontaine’s first two arguments as to why he was entitled to
summary judgment, he contends that he “did not know of a substantial risk of
serious harm to Aberha.” Delafontaine first argues that “the only factual allegation
of what exactly was reported . . . comes from [his own] declaration,” which
“clearly establishes there was no report of a sexual assault.” In the alternative, he
argues that “an [inmate’s] uncorroborated allegation [of sexual assault] alone is not
sufficient to establish the subjective component of deliberate indifference.” We
lack jurisdiction to consider these arguments. “[D]eterminations of evidentiary
sufficiency at summary judgment are not immediately appealable” in a qualified
immunity case “if what is at issue . . . is . . . whether the evidence could support a
finding that particular conduct occurred.” Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313
(1996). Therefore, we dismiss the appeal to the extent it raises these issues.
2. Delafontaine also argues that he “took a reasonable step after learning of
the . . . threat” to Aberha by “instigating an investigation into Aberha’s allegation”
of sexual assault. The district court did not explicitly address this argument,1 so
we must “review . . . the record to determine what facts the district court, in the
1
Delafontaine did not raise the issue below. To the extent we have subject
matter jurisdiction, we usually “decline to consider arguments raised for the first
time on appeal,” though we have discretion to do so if “the issue is purely one of
law, does not affect or rely upon the factual record developed by the parties, and
will not prejudice the party against whom it is raised.” Paeste v. Gov’t of Guam,
798 F.3d 1228, 1235 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Dream Palace v. County of
Maricopa, 384 F.3d 990, 1005 (9th Cir. 2004)).
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light most favorable to the nonmoving party, likely assumed.” Behrens, 516 U.S.
at 313 (quoting Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319 (1995)). Because the record
lacks evidence that Delafontaine took any steps after Aberha reported the first
sexual assault until Delafontaine responded to the third sexual assault—when the
investigation was already underway—the district court likely assumed that
Delafontaine did not instigate the investigation. Although Delafontaine disputes
this implicit finding, we lack jurisdiction to revisit the district court’s assessment of
the evidence in the record. See id. Therefore, we also dismiss the appeal as to this
issue.
3. Lastly, Delafontaine argues that “there is no clearly established law that
put [him] on clear notice that his actions constituted cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” We disagree. In September 2018, when
the incident at issue here occurred, it was clearly established that Delafontaine’s
conduct—viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Aberha—violated the
Eighth Amendment. It “has been clearly established since the Supreme Court’s
decision in Farmer . . . in 1994” that an inmate has the “right to be protected from
violence at the hands of other inmates.” Wilk v. Neven, 956 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th
Cir. 2020). And since Clem v. Lomeli, 566 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2009), it has been
clear that a correctional officer’s “doing nothing in response to [an inmate’s] pleas
for help” after the inmate’s cellmate threatened physical violence is “unreasonable,
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amounting to ‘deliberate indifference.’” Wilk, 956 F.3d at 1148 (quoting Clem,
566 F.3d at 1182). We affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on
this ground.
AFFIRMED in part; DISMISSED in part.
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