Dan Goodrick v. Terema Carlin

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION SEP 04 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DAN GOODRICK, No. 13-35923
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 1:10-cv-00603-EJL
v.
MEMORANDUM*
TEREMA CARLIN; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
Edward J. Lodge, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 25, 2015**
Before: McKEOWN, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Idaho state prisoner Dan Goodrick appeals pro se from the district court’s
summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various constitutional
claims arising out of his disciplinary hearing and a strip search. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Toguchi v. Chung, 391
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Goodrick’s
retaliation claims because Goodrick failed to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether defendants’ decisions to discipline him did not advance
legitimate correctional goals. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 568 (9th Cir.
2005) (elements of retaliation claim).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Goodrick’s due
process claims because Goodrick failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact
as to whether his placement in administrative segregation following disciplinary
convictions implicated a protected liberty interest. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.
472, 484, 486 (1995) (concluding that “discipline in segregated confinement does
not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation” required to create a liberty
interest); see also Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003)
(procedural protections apply to disciplinary proceedings “only when the
disciplinary action implicates a protected liberty interest”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Goodrick’s Fourth
and Eighth Amendment claims arising out of a strip search because Goodrick
failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the search was
unreasonable, or undertaken with deliberate indifference to his health and safety.
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See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979) (factors to be considered when
evaluating whether search was unreasonable under Fourth Amendment); see also
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (concluding that a “prison official
cannot be found liable [under the Eighth Amendment]. . . unless the official knows
of and disregards excessive risk to inmate health or safety”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Goodrick’s motion
to strike evidence of his prior convictions because the evidence was relevant and
offered to show defendants’ knowledge. See El Pollo Loco, Inc. v. Hashim, 316
F.3d 1032, 1038 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth standard of review); see also Fed. R.
Evid. 404(b)(2) (prior conviction evidence may be admissible to show knowledge).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Goodrick’s motions
for appointment of counsel because Goodrick did not demonstrate exceptional
circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting
forth standard of review and requirements for appointment of counsel).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Goodrick’s motion
to compel because Goodrick failed to establish actual and substantial prejudice.
See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth standard of
review and requiring a showing of “actual and substantial prejudice” resulting from
the denial of discovery (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
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We reject as unsupported by the record Goodrick’s argument that the district
court failed to consider his exhibits or to make them part of the record.
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal or in the reply brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir.
2009) (per curiam).
AFFIRMED.
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