Kirk Erichsen v. County of Orange

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
FEB 17 2017
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KIRK R. ERICHSEN, an individual; et al., No. 16-55763
Plaintiffs-Appellants, D.C. No.
2:14-cv-02357-JAK-SS
v.
COUNTY OF ORANGE; et al., MEMORANDUM*
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
John A. Kronstadt, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 14, 2017**
Pasadena, California
Before: D.W. NELSON, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Appellants challenge the district court’s denial of their ex parte application
for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) in which they sought to (1) enjoin state
court child dependency proceedings and the enforcement of related protective
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
custody and arrest warrants, and (2) stay all discovery in federal court. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), and we AFFIRM.
First, we note that the district court properly determined Appellants failed to
meet the threshold requirement for ex parte relief because they did not establish
they were “without fault in creating the crisis that requires ex parte relief.”
Mission Power Eng’g Co. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 883 F. Supp. 488, 492 (C.D. Cal.
1995). The district court also correctly concluded that Appellants’ requested relief
was procedurally improper because Appellants were essentially using their
application for a TRO to challenge the magistrate judge’s ruling that Kirk and
Krystal Erichsen (the “Erichsens”) were required to appear for their depositions.
Second, the district court did not err in denying the application for a TRO on
the basis of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and Younger abstention. There is some
question as to whether all of the state court proceedings had concluded when
Appellants filed this action in federal court. To the extent that the state court
proceedings were ongoing, the district court properly held that Younger abstention
required denial of the TRO application. See San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of
Commerce Political Action Comm. v. City of San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th
Cir. 2008). However, to the extent that the state court proceedings had concluded,
then the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precluded district court review because
2
Appellants were “state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the [federal] district court proceedings commenced,”
and were “inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon-
Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); see
Lacy-Curry v. Alameda Cty. Soc. Servs. Agency, 262 F. App’x 9, 10 (9th Cir.
2007).
Finally, we decline to exercise pendant jurisdiction over the separate
question of whether the district court abused its discretion in ordering the
Erichsens to appear in person for their depositions. The district court’s denial of
the TRO application is not inextricably intertwined with its order regarding the
Erichsens’ appearance at their depositions. Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990,
996 (9th Cir. 2012). Nor does the issue of whether the Erichsens were required to
appear at their depositions “call[] into question the district court’s authority to
rule” on the Erichsens’ application for a TRO. Id. at 996–97 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
AFFIRMED.
3