Stephen Yagman v. Cornell Companies, Inc.

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAY 10 2017
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
STEPHEN YAGMAN, No. 15-56581
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:14-cv-07555-SVW-
CW
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CORNELL COMPANIES, INC.; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 8, 2017**
Pasadena, California
Before: WALLACE, CHRISTEN, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Stephen Yagman appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing his
action asserting claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388(1971), the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
U.S.C. § 1962, and state law. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
and we affirm.
We review the district court’s dismissal of Yagman’s action under Rule
12(b)(6) de novo. Libas Ltd. v. Carillo, 329 F.3d 1128, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003). The
first eight counts in Yagman’s amended complaint arise under Bivens and concern
alleged violations of his civil and constitutional rights resulting from a failed drug
test while living at a halfway house and his subsequent incarceration. Each of these
events occurred before Yagman’s release from custody on November 8, 2010.
Bivens actions, like those arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are governed by
the relevant state’s statute of limitations applicable to personal injury claims. Van
Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 408–10 (9th Cir. 1991). In California, such claims
are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Cal. Civ. Proc. § 335.1; see also
Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 2004). The limitations period
can be tolled for up to two years if the cause of action accrues while the plaintiff is
incarcerated. Cal. Civ. Proc. § 352.1(a). Accordingly, the two-year statute began to
run on Yagman’s claims when he was released on November 8, 2010, meaning that
he had until November 8, 2012, to file his action. Yagman, however, did not file
this action until September 29, 2014. His Bivens claims are therefore time-barred,
and the district court did not err in so concluding.
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Yagman relies on Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), to argue that his
Bivens claims did not accrue until the district court issued a writ of habeas corpus
on October 1, 2012. Under Heck, a claim for damages resulting from an
unconstitutional conviction or sentence “does not accrue until the conviction or
sentence has been invalidated.” Id. at 489–90. Yagman contends that the
“sentence” at issue—the Bureau of Prisons’ (Bureau) revocation of good time
credits and imposition of “close confinement”—was not invalidated until the
district court granted his habeas petition.
He is mistaken. As we have previously concluded, the writ of habeas corpus
upon which Yagman relies was issued in error. The district court lacked
jurisdiction to issue the writ because Yagman’s petition became moot when the
Bureau vacated the disciplinary proceedings that led to the incarceration he was
challenging. Yagman v. Thomas, 612 F. App’x 408, 409 (9th Cir. 2015)
(unpublished). As a result, the only possible invalidation of his sentence for Heck
purposes occurred in 2010 when the Bureau vacated the proceedings that preceded
it. The statute of limitations therefore ran in 2012, almost two years before
Yagman filed this action.
The same considerations also doom his state law malicious prosecution
causes of action. Such are subject to the same two-year statute of limitations,
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Stavropoulos v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. App. 4th 190, 196–97 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006), and similarly “accrue[] at the conclusion of the litigation in favor of the
party allegedly prosecuted maliciously,” Babb v. Superior Court, 479 P.2d 379,
381 (Cal. 1971). As just discussed, the erroneously-issued writ did not terminate
the relevant proceedings in Yagman’s favor, thus leaving the Bureau’s own
invalidation as the only possible accrual point. The state malicious prosecution
causes of action are time-barred.
Yagman also challenges the district court’s dismissal of his RICO claims for
failure to state a claim. Although he argues for a liberal construction of his
complaint, none of the authorities he cites exempt RICO claims from the usual
pleading requirements. Indeed, we have previously applied those requirements
when reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of civil RICO claims. See Eclectic
Props. E., LLC v. Marcus & Millichap Co., 751 F.3d 990, 997–1000 (9th Cir.
2014). The allegations in the amended complaint are entirely conclusory and lack
the factual content necessary to state claims under RICO. Accordingly, the district
court did not err in dismissing those claims. Furthermore, it was not an abuse of
discretion to deny Yagman leave to amend because he had already amended the
complaint once and further amendment would have been futile. See Allen v. City of
Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d 367, 373 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The district court’s discretion to
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deny leave to amend is particularly broad where plaintiff has previously amended
the complaint” (quoting Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160
(9th Cir. 1989))).
Yagman next contests the district court’s denial of his motions for summary
adjudication. We have discretion to review such denials where they are
“accompanied by a final order disposing of all issues before the district court and
where the record has been sufficiently developed to support meaningful review of
the denied motion[s].” Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 973
F.2d 688, 694 n.2 (9th Cir. 1992), citing Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465,
1468–72, 1482 n.20 (9th Cir. 1988). Our review is de novo. Te-Moak Tribe of W.
Shoshone of Nev. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 608 F.3d 592, 598 (9th Cir. 2010).
We are skeptical that the record has been adequately developed to permit
“meaningful review” of these denials, considering that no discovery took place. In
any event, our conclusion that the district court properly dismissed Yagman’s
action disposes of his argument that the court should not have denied his motions
for summary adjudication.
Finally, Yagman asserts that the magistrate judge improperly denied his
motions for sanctions and the district judge improperly denied his motions for
reconsideration under Rule 72(a). We review the rulings on the motions for
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sanctions for abuse of discretion. See Islamic Shura Council of S. Cal. v. FBI, 757
F.3d 870, 872 (9th Cir. 2014). The district court’s denials of reconsideration are
reviewed “under a ‘clearly erroneous or contrary to law’ standard.” See Rivera v.
NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 2004), quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).
Yagman argues that the magistrate judge’s mass denial of his sanctions
motions shows that she did not “giv[e] due consideration to their merits.” But he
has provided no authority supporting that proposition, and it is not an abuse of
discretion per se to “summarily deny[] a request for sanctions without making
specific findings of facts.” Winterrowd v. Am. Gen. Annuity Ins. Co., 556 F.3d 815,
826 (9th Cir. 2009). Yagman makes no additional arguments for reversal, so we
hold that the magistrate judge did not abuse her discretion. We further affirm the
denial of Yagman’s motions for reconsideration because he has raised no
independent argument as to why they were erroneous, let alone “clearly erroneous
or contrary to law.” Rivera, 364 F.3d at 1063.
AFFIRMED.
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