Eric Hood v. South Whidbey School District

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 22 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ERIC D. HOOD, No. 14-35256
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:11-cv-02024-RAJ
v.
MEMORANDUM*
SOUTH WHIDBEY SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Richard A. Jones, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 13, 2015**
Before: LEAVY, CALLAHAN, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Eric D. Hood appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in
his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging denial of access to courts and state law claims,
following an arbitration over the nonrenewal of his teaching contract. We have
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Blankenhorn v. City of
Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 470 (9th Cir. 2007), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Hood failed
to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he suffered an actual injury
as a result of defendant’s alleged withholding of pre-arbitration documents. See
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351-53 (1996) (access-to-courts claim requires the
plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct caused actual injury);
Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1061 (9th Cir.
2011) (“To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must set forth non-speculative
evidence of specific facts, not sweeping conclusory allegations.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorneys’ fees
against Hood as a sanction because Hood filed three frivolous discovery motions
after the district court specifically warned him to discontinue such behavior. See
F. J. Hanshaw Enters., Inc. v. Emerald River Dev., Inc., 244 F.3d 1128, 1135 (9th
Cir. 2001) (setting forth standard of review).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hood’s motion for
leave to amend his amended complaint because amendment would have been
futile, and Hood did not demonstrate good cause. See Johnson v. Buckley, 356
F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004) (setting forth standard of review and explaining
2 14-35256
that “[f]utility alone can justify the denial of a motion to amend” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations,
Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-09 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining “good cause” standard).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hood’s motions for
reconsideration because Hood did not demonstrate that such relief was warranted.
See Smith v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 727 F.3d 950, 954-55 (9th Cir. 2013) (setting
forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration).
We do not consider issues not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in
the opening brief, or arguments raised for the first time in the reply brief. See
Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Hood’s motion to file an oversized reply brief, filed on October 21, 2014, is
granted. The Clerk is instructed to file the Reply Brief.
Hood’s request for sanctions, as set forth in his opening brief, is denied.
Defendant’s requests for attorneys’ fees and costs, as set forth in their
responses to Hood’s motions for sanctions and to transmit documents, are denied
without prejudice to filing a timely motion for attorneys’ fees and a timely bill of
costs.
All other pending motions are denied.
AFFIRMED.
3 14-35256