Auction Block Company v. Federal Maritime Commission

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 28 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AUCTION BLOCK COMPANY and No. 14-72609
HARBOR LEASING, LLC,
Petitioners,
MEMORANDUM*
v.
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION
and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondents,
CITY OF HOMER,
Respondent-Intervenor.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Federal Maritime Commission
Argued and Submitted May 14, 2015
Anchorage, Alaska
Before: CANBY, BYBEE, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
The Federal Maritime Commission correctly dismissed petitioners’
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The parties agree that the Commission had
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Page 2 of 4
jurisdiction only if the City of Homer qualifies as a “marine terminal operator”
under the Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. § 40101 et seq.1 The Act defines
“marine terminal operator” as “a person engaged in the United States in the
business of providing . . . terminal facilities in connection with a common carrier.”
Id. § 40102(14). “Common carrier,” in turn, is defined as a person transporting
passengers or cargo through the use of “a vessel operating on the high seas . . .
between a port in the United States and a port in a foreign country.” Id.
§ 40102(6).
The City of Homer provides terminal facilities to common carriers at the
Deep Water Dock and the Pioneer Dock. But petitioners’ complaint arises out of a
dispute involving the City’s Fish Dock. The Commission determined that the City
is not a “marine terminal operator” with respect to the Fish Dock because, while
the City provides terminal facilities there, it does not do so “in connection with a
common carrier.” Id. § 40102(14).
1
Petitioners argue that the Commission dismissed this case for lack of
personal jurisdiction, rather than subject matter jurisdiction, and that the City
waived the issue below. We reject that argument. Whether the Commission has
the statutory authority to adjudicate this dispute is plainly a matter of subject
matter jurisdiction, and therefore the issue cannot be waived. See Transpacific
Westbound Rate Agreement v. Fed. Maritime Comm’n, 951 F.2d 950, 957 (9th Cir.
1991); New Orleans S.S. Ass’n v. Plaquemines Port, Harbor & Terminal Dist., 23
S.R.R. 1363, 1371 (FMC 1986).
Page 3 of 4
We find no error in the Commission’s determination. Petitioners have
conceded that they are not common carriers, and they have produced no evidence
that any other common carriers call at the Fish Dock. The only question, then, is
whether the Commission permissibly interpreted the definition of “marine terminal
operator” as calling for a facility-specific analysis.
We conclude that the Commission’s interpretation is entitled to deference
under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984). The Shipping Act is silent on the question posed here—whether, in
interpreting the definition of “marine terminal operator,” the Commission should
consider all facilities operated by the defendant or just the facilities at issue in the
dispute. The agency reasonably chose the latter interpretation. Premising
jurisdiction on all facilities operated by a defendant would potentially create absurd
results inconsistent with the purposes of the Shipping Act. Congress intended the
Shipping Act to limit abusive behavior by steamship lines given the limited
antitrust immunity such lines receive under the Act. The Commission’s regulatory
authority therefore covers common carriers and those marine terminal operators
whose facilities are necessary for common carriers to conduct their business. The
Commission reasonably concluded that it makes little sense to bring into its
regulatory ambit all facilities operated by an entity merely because a single one of
Page 4 of 4
them is connected to international marine transportation. Adopting a contrary
interpretation would compel the Commission to decide cases entirely unrelated to
the carriage of cargo by sea—involving, for example, an inland railyard or
warehouse owned by the defendant—so long as the defendant provided terminal
facilities to common carriers at another location. The facility-specific
interpretation adopted by the Commission reasonably limits its jurisdiction to those
cases with a connection to international shipping.
Petitioners contend that the Commission committed various evidentiary
errors in the course of rendering its decision. Any such errors are harmless, as
none of the excluded or included evidence suggests that the Fish Dock services
common carriers. We deny petitioners’ motion to compel the Commission to file
the complete agency record before this court. Any unfiled documents to which
petitioners make reference, if indeed any remain unfiled, have no bearing on
whether common carriers call at the Fish Dock.
Finally, the Commission did not err in granting the City’s motion to strike
and motion for sanctions. The Commission’s rulings were reasonably premised on
petitioners’ misconduct in discovery.
PETITION DENIED.