United States v. Olaf Juda

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FEB 22 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 11-10298
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 3:91-cr-00324-WHA-1
v.
MEMORANDUM *
OLAF PETER JUDA, pro se,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
William Alsup, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 11, 2013
San Francisco, California
Before: SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Olaf Peter Juda (“Juda”) appeals the modification of his conditions of
supervised release and order dismissing his motion to dismiss the supervised release
revocation proceedings. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
I.
We review de novo the district court’s authority to modify Juda’s terms of
supervised release, United States v. Miller, 205 F.3d 1098, 1100 (9th Cir. 2000), and
determine that, having properly considered the statutorily enumerated factors, there
was full authority to modify Juda’s conditions of supervised release under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(2). See United States v. Gross, 307 F.3d 1043, 1044 (2002). Changed
circumstances were not required to modify those conditions. See Miller, 205 F.3d at
1100; see also, e.g., United States v. Navarro-Espinosa, 30 F.3d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir.
1994).
Reviewing for abuse of discretion, United States v. Napulou, 593 F.3d 1041,
1044 (9th Cir. 2010), we hold that the imposition of these particular conditions was
not an abuse of discretion in light of the nature of Juda’s original offense and post-
release behavior. See United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2010).
II.
While we may consider whether district courts have authority to revoke a term
of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583, see, e.g., United States v. Wing, 682
F.3d 861, 863 (9th Cir. 2012), the validity of a conviction may not be collaterally
attacked in, or on appeal from, a supervised release revocation proceeding. United
States v. Simmons, 812 F.2d 561, 563 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing United States v. Lustig,
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555 F.2d 751, 753 (9th Cir. 1977)) (“[A] conviction may be collaterally attacked only
in a separate proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and a court should consider the
petition for probation revocation as if the underlying conviction was unquestioned.”).
Thus, Juda may not challenge the district court’s jurisdiction over the revocation
proceedings based on a claim that his underlying sentence is invalid. See, e.g., United
States v. Ruiz-Camarena, 141 F. App’x 580, 581 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Simmons, 812
F.2d at 563) (rejecting a similar challenge to a district court’s jurisdiction to consider
a petition for revocation of supervised release).
AFFIRMED.
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