United States v. Mario Chavez-Tello

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FEB 20 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 12-50199
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 3:10-cr-02463-JLS-1
v.
MEMORANDUM *
MARIO CHAVEZ-TELLO,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Janis L. Sammartino, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 5, 2013
Pasadena, California
Before: PREGERSON, W. FLETCHER, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Mario Chavez-Tello appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss
supervised release revocation proceedings. The government initiated proceedings
to revoke Chavez-Tello’s three-year supervised release term from a prior
conviction after a new conviction for illegal reentry. Chavez-Tello filed a motion
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
to dismiss the proceedings in light of amendments to United States Sentencing
Guidelines § 5D1.1(c). The district court noted that the guideline amendments
were not retroactive and that Chavez-Tello was sentenced before they took effect.
The court found that it had no authority to dismiss the proceedings, and it denied
Chavez-Tello’s motion. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
affirm.
The parties dispute the appropriate standard of review. Chavez-Tello argues
that we should review the district court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, citing
United States v. Barrera-Moreno, 951 F.2d 1089, 1091 (9th Cir. 1991). The
government argues that plain-error review applies here because Chavez-Tello has
raised new claims on appeal. See United States v. Gallegos, 613 F.3d 1211,
1213–14 (9th Cir. 2010). It is unnecessary to decide this question because there
was no error here, plain or otherwise. We also assume without deciding that
Chavez-Tello did not forfeit his right to appeal by admitting that he violated his
supervised release conditions.
The district court correctly determined that it did not have the legal authority
to dismiss the revocation proceedings under these circumstances. On appeal,
Chavez-Tello identifies two possible sources of authority. First, he points to 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e). That provision authorizes the district court to take certain
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enumerated actions related to supervised release terms. However, by its terms §
3583(e) does not give the court the discretionary authority to simply dismiss
revocation proceedings at any time as Chavez-Tello urges.
Second, Chavez-Tello argues that the district court can dismiss revocation
proceedings for any reason pursuant to its inherent supervisory powers. He has
provided no authority directly supporting this position. A district court’s inherent
powers to dismiss a prosecution are typically limited to situations where a
defendant’s rights have been violated or where the integrity of judicial proceedings
has otherwise been compromised. See United States v. Miller, 4 F.3d 792, 795 (9th
Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Chapman, 524 F.3d 1073, 1087 (9th Cir.
2008) (“A court may dismiss an indictment under its supervisory powers only
when the defendant suffers substantial prejudice and where no lesser remedial
action is available.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
We see no reason to depart from these principles under the circumstances
here. Chavez-Tello has not alleged any prosecutorial misconduct or other
violations of his rights. Moreover, the district court already had the statutory
authority to remedy any injustice by declining to revoke his supervised release
term after weighing the applicable statutory factors. See § 3583(e). Given the
availability of this “lesser remedial action,” Chapman, 524 F.3d at 1087, we
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conclude that the district court lacked the authority to dismiss revocation
proceedings pursuant to its supervisory powers under these circumstances. See
Miller, 4 F.3d at 795.
AFFIRMED.
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