Vanessa Haldeman v. Ruth Golden

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOV 23 2009
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
VANESSA HALDEMAN; et al., No. 08-15648
Plaintiffs - Appellees, D.C. No. 05-CV-00810-DAE
v.
MEMORANDUM *
RUTH GOLDEN, in her individual
capacity; et al.,
Defendants,
and
KAREN DUTY, in her individual
capacity,
Defendant - Appellant.
VANESSA HALDEMAN; et al., No. 08-16352
Plaintiffs - Appellees, D.C. No. 1:05-cv-00810-DAE-
KSC
v.
RUTH GOLDEN, in her individual
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
capacity; et al.,
Defendants,
and
DONALD CUPP, in his individual
capacity,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
David A. Ezra, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 14, 2009
Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: BEEZER, GRABER and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
State social workers Karen Duty and Donald Cupp appeal from the district
court’s partial denial of qualified immunity from child-plaintiffs Vanessa and
Benjamin Haldeman’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims. We have
jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals taken from a district court’s denial of
summary judgment based on a claim of qualified immunity. Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). We review a district court’s denial of qualified
immunity de novo on appeal. Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994). We
reverse the district court’s denial of qualified immunity.
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The facts of this case are known to the parties. We do not repeat them.
The claims contained in counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 10 of the Haldeman
children’s second amended complaint as alleged against Duty and Cupp are
properly before the court on appeal. We do not decide any other issues as to any
other parties.
I
Counts 1 and 2 of the Haldeman children’s second amended complaint
contain their § 1983 claims and conspiracy claims against Duty and Cupp.
Qualified immunity protects § 1983 defendants from civil liability unless their
conduct violated “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982). Under Pearson v. Callahan, the court may determine whether the
constitutional right asserted was clearly established at the time of the alleged
violation without first determining whether the defendants actually violated a
constitutional right. 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009).
A
The district court incorrectly denied Duty and Cupp qualified immunity
against the constitutional claims contained in count 1, including claims resting on
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allegations of assuming custody of the Haldeman children, filing a petition in the
family court and causing Vanessa’s medical examination.
Duty and Cupp are entitled to summary judgment for taking custody of the
Haldeman children. The clearly established constitutional right of parents and
children to live together without government interference, Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 753 (1982), is limited by the government’s need to investigate serious
claims of abuse. Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000). Duty and
Cupp had a serious and important obligation to protect child welfare and had good
cause to believe that parental sexual abuse had occurred. Duty and Cupp did not
need a court order to take custody of the children because they had reasonable
cause to believe that both children were in “imminent danger of serious bodily
injury.” Id.
Duty and Cupp are entitled to absolute immunity against claims based on the
filing of a custody petition in family court. See Beltran v. Santa Clara County, 514
F.3d 906, 908 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (en banc). Duty and Cupp are also
entitled to qualified immunity against claims that they deliberately falsified
evidence. The Haldeman children fail to support their claim of deliberate evidence
falsification with anything other than expert reports that criticize Duty and Cupp’s
interviewing techniques. “[T]here is no constitutional due process right to have
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child witnesses in a child sexual abuse investigation interviewed in a particular
manner, or to have the investigation carried out in a particular way.” Devereaux v.
Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
Duty and Cupp are entitled to summary judgment for claims that they caused
Vanessa’s medical exam. No evidence in the record links Duty and Cupp to the
authorization or performance of the medical exam. The Haldeman children thus
bear the burden of providing evidence demonstrating a genuine issue of material
fact for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1076. The Haldeman
children offer no evidence of Duty’s or Cupp’s personal participation.
B
Duty and Cupp are entitled to summary judgment on count 2, which alleges
a civil conspiracy. A civil conspiracy claim, as opposed to a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985, holds private actors liable under § 1983 when they conspire with state
actors to violate a person’s constitutional rights. Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914,
920 (1984). It is not a means of holding state actors liable on claims from which
they are otherwise immune. While the existence of a conspiracy would eliminate
the requirement that Duty and Cupp personally participated in Vanessa’s medical
exam, no evidence in the record supports the existence of an agreement to carry out
that exam.
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II
Counts 4, 5, 7, 8 and 10 of the Haldeman children’s second amended
complaint raise claims of negligence, gross negligence, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, social worker malpractice and invasion of privacy. All of these
claims are based on Duty and Cupp having taken custody of the Haldeman
children, filing the custody petition in family court and causing Vanessa’s medical
examination.
The district court incorrectly denied state law immunity to Duty and Cupp
on all counts. Hawaii state law provides immunity to state social workers
investigating child abuse cases for acts performed within the scope of their duties.
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 350-3(b). This statute provides at least the same level of
immunity as provided under federal law. The same analysis above therefore
applies to the state law claims.
The district court is directed to dismiss all claims against Duty and Cupp.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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