United States v. Kevin Hawkins

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
APR 21 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 16-10145
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
2:10-cr-00458-JAM-3
v.
KEVIN HAWKINS, AKA Ket T. MEMORANDUM*
Hawkins,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding
Argued March 15, 2017 Submitted April 21, 2017
San Francisco, California
Before: WARDLAW, GOULD, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Kevin Hawkins appeals his conviction for witness tampering in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(B). Hawkins contends that the district court
violated his Sixth Amendment right to represent himself and was without
jurisdiction to impose his sentence. We agree that the district court clearly erred in
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
finding Hawkins’s request to represent himself equivocal, vacate his conviction
and sentence, and remand. We do not reach the merits of Hawkins’s challenge to
his sentence.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to counsel,
as well as the corollary right to waive counsel and represent himself in his criminal
proceedings. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821 (1975). “If a
defendant’s request to proceed pro se is timely, not for purposes of delay,
unequivocal, voluntary, intelligent and the defendant is competent, it must be
granted.” United States v. Maness, 566 F.3d 894, 896 (9th Cir. 2009). For a
request to be unequivocal, the “defendant must make an explicit choice between
exercising the right to counsel and the right to self-representation so that a court
may be reasonably certain that the defendant wishes to represent himself.” United
States v. Arlt, 41 F.3d 516, 519 (9th Cir. 1994). “A district court’s finding that a
defendant’s waiver is equivocal is a finding of fact reviewed for clear error.”
United States v. Mendez-Sanchez, 563 F.3d 935, 944 (9th Cir. 2009).1
1
We have not yet clarified whether denial of a request to proceed pro se is
reviewed de novo or for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Kaczynski, 239
F.3d 1108, 1116 (9th Cir. 2001). Under either standard, however, the district court
erred in denying Hawkins’s request.
2
The record does not support the district court’s finding that Hawkins was
equivocal in his request to proceed pro se. The nature of Hawkins’s request was
clear to the parties and to the judge, such that the district court set a hearing solely
to address Hawkins’s request. At the Faretta hearing, Hawkins repeatedly and
unambiguously asserted that he wished to represent himself, without qualifications
or reservations. The district court warned Hawkins of the difficulties in proceeding
pro se, but Hawkins persisted. His request was not the result of “mere whim or
caprice.” United States v. Robinson, 913 F.2d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 1990). And he
clearly made his continued request with “eyes open.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835.
The government’s arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. That
Hawkins sought to represent himself two weeks after informing the court that he
wanted to be represented by counsel does not diminish the unequivocal nature of
his request at his Faretta hearing. Finding otherwise would suggest that any
request to proceed pro se is equivocal unless the defendant asserts the right to self-
representation from the outset of his criminal proceedings. No authority supports
this contention, and we decline to adopt it here. Faretta self-representation
requests have been made by defendants who were previously represented by
counsel without initial objection by the defendant. See, e.g., United States v.
Farias, 618 F.3d 1049, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 2010).
3
The district court made no finding that Hawkins’s request was untimely or
that the request was made in bad faith to secure delay or abuse the judicial process.
Nor do the parties dispute that Hawkins was “made aware of (1) the nature of the
charges against him; (2) the possible penalties; and (3) the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation.” United States v. Farhad, 190 F.3d 1097,
1099 (9th Cir. 1999).
The district court clearly erred in denying Hawkins’s request to proceed pro
se on the ground that Hawkins was equivocal. The request was unequivocal,
timely, and informed. Because the denial of this request is structural error, and not
subject to harmless error review, we vacate Hawkins’s conviction and remand for a
new trial. See Farias, 618 F.3d at 1055.2
VACATED AND REMANDED.
2
We previously withdrew submission and ordered Hawkins to advise us
within ten days if he wanted to withdraw his appeal or proceed for the panel to
decide it. Hawkins filed a pro se response, see Dkt. No. 39, which we can only
interpret as requesting us to decide his appeal on the denial of his Faretta request.
We are therefore, simultaneous with the filing of this memorandum disposition,
filing an order resubmitting the appeal for decision. Hawkins has shown that his
right to represent himself was violated and therefore his conviction and sentence
are vacated and the case is remanded for a new trial. Hawkins’s response makes
numerous other requests of this court, which are not properly before us and instead
should be addressed to the district court on remand.
4