Layton v. United States Air Force

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 23 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ORVILLE W.J. LAYTON, No. 16-70081
Petitioner, MSPB No. SF-1221-14-0805-W-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Merit Systems Protection Board
Submitted August 17, 2017**
Anchorage, Alaska
Before: GRABER, CLIFTON, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Orville Layton challenges the decision by the Merit Systems
Protection Board (MSPB, or the Board) affirming an administrative judge’s (AJ)
denial of Petitioner’s complaint filed pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection Act
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
of 1989 (WPA), as well as the Board’s affirmance of two prehearing rulings made
by the AJ. The Board ruled that Petitioner had made out a prima facie case of
whistleblower retaliation, but that Respondent had carried its burden of establishing
by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the relevant personnel
actions—specifically, reassignment to administrative law duties and the issuance of
a formal written reprimand—against Petitioner even absent his protected
disclosures. In regard to the AJ’s prehearing rulings, the Board held that the AJ did
not abuse his discretion either by denying Petitioner’s motion to compel discovery
as untimely, or by rejecting Petitioner’s additional witnesses on the basis that
Petitioner failed to comply with the AJ’s order regarding the consideration of
additional witnesses.
We will set aside the MSPB’s decision only if it is “(1) arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without
procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or (3)
unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). Applying that standard,
we affirm.
The Board analyzed Respondent’s action against Petitioner using the three
factors set forth in Carr v. Social Security Administration, 185 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir.
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1999): (1) “the strength of the agency’s evidence in support of its personnel action,”
(2) “the existence and strength of any motive to retaliate on the part of the agency
officials who were involved in the decision,” and (3) “any evidence that the agency
takes similar actions against employees who are not whistleblowers but who are
otherwise similarly situated.” Id. at 1323.
Regarding the first factor, Respondent presented evidence that it
(1) reassigned Petitioner in response to his own demand that something be done to
alleviate his hostile work conditions, and (2) issued him a formal reprimand as a
consequence of his failure to follow express orders. The Board accepted those
explanations for Respondent’s actions, which Respondent supported with witness
testimony, email documentation, memoranda, and Petitioner’s own written account
of a hostile work environment. We recognize that, when applying the first Carr
factor, “[i]f considerable countervailing evidence is manifestly ignored or
disregarded in finding a matter clearly and convincingly proven, the decision must
be vacated and remanded for further consideration where all the pertinent evidence
is weighed.” Whitmore v. Dep’t of Labor, 680 F.3d 1353, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
The Board did not, however, ignore or disregard considerable countervailing
evidence in this case.
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Turning to the second Carr factor, the Board found that Petitioner’s direct
supervisor, John Whittington, made the decision both to reassign Petitioner and to
issue the reprimand, and that Whittington lacked any motive to retaliate against
Petitioner. Petitioner points to evidence that other employees had motive to retaliate
against him as a result of his protected disclosures. The Board acknowledged this
evidence, but found it inapposite in light of Whittington’s sole responsibility for
decisions regarding Petitioner’s employment, and those other employees’ lack of
influence or authority over Whittington. Substantial evidence supported the Board’s
finding that Whittington was not implicated in any manner by Petitioner’s
disclosures.
Finally, the record contained no evidence regarding the third Carr factor—
whether Respondent has taken similar personnel action against similarly situated
employees who are not whistleblowers—and that factor accordingly played no role
in the Board’s analysis. “Carr does not impose an affirmative burden on the agency
to produce evidence with respect to each and every one of the three Carr factors to
weigh them each individually in the agency’s favor.” Miller v. Dep’t of Justice, 842
F.3d 1252, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Whitmore, 680 F.3d at 1374). Rather, the
Board may review the record as a whole, treating the Carr factors merely as
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“appropriate and pertinent considerations for determining whether the agency carries
its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the same action would
have been taken absent the whistleblowing.” Id. Petitioner speculates on appeal that
other similarly situated employees must exist and that Respondent’s failure to
produce evidence regarding those comparators requires a finding in his favor.
Absent any evidence regarding such comparators, however, the Board did not err in
declining to weigh the third Carr factor in its analysis.
In addition to his challenge to the merits of the Board’s determination,
Petitioner challenges two pre-hearing orders by the AJ: an order denying Petitioner’s
motion to compel discovery as untimely, and an order precluding Petitioner from
offering additional witness testimony. Petitioner’s motion to compel was filed
outside the timeframe set by 5 C.F.R. § 1201.73(d) and by order of the AJ. In light
of Petitioner’s late submission and his failure to seek an extension or to show good
cause for his untimeliness, the AJ did not abuse his discretion by denying Petitioner’s
motion as untimely. See Fellhoelter v. Dep’t of Agric., 568 F.3d 965, 977 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
As to the AJ’s rejection of Petitioner’s additional witness testimony, “the
admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the Board.” Langer v.
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Dep’t of Treasury, 265 F.3d 1259, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The AJ granted Petitioner
leave to offer testimony from previously denied witnesses, conditioned upon
Petitioner’s submission of “a more detailed proffer of their relevance and a statement
indicating that [Petitioner] discussed and/or attempted to discuss the anticipated
testimony with the requested witness.” Petitioner failed to provide the required
attestation that he had conferred with his proposed witnesses. Absent this reasonably
requested assurance that the witness testimony would indeed be relevant, the AJ did
not abuse his discretion by denying Petitioner’s request to offer additional testimony.
See Whitmore, 680 F.3d at 1369.
AFFIRMED.
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