Leiva v. Cate

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 16 2009
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JANETTA LYNN LEIVA, No. 08-15008
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. CV-04-06669-WMW
v.
MEMORANDUM *
MATTHEW CATE,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
William M. Wunderlich, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 8, 2009**
San Francisco, California
Before: TASHIMA, GRABER and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner-Appellant Janetta Lynn Leiva appeals the district court’s denial of
her petition for writ of habeas corpus. Leiva argues that her Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination was violated when her statements, made during a
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
pre-trial competency examination and without Miranda warnings, were admitted
into evidence at the insanity phase of her murder trial. We affirm.
Because Leiva’s habeas petition was adjudicated on the merits in state court,
we may grant the petition only if the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1);
see also Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997). The relevant state court
decision here is that of the California Court of Appeal, see Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501
U.S. 797, 805-06 (1991), which held that the admission of Leiva’s statements did
not violate her Fifth Amendment rights. Leiva argues that this decision was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal
law as determined by the Supreme Court in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
In Estelle, the Supreme Court held that “[a] criminal defendant, who neither
initiates a psychiatric evaluation nor attempts to introduce any psychiatric
evidence, may not be compelled to respond to a psychiatrist if his statements can
be used against him at a capital sentencing proceeding.” Id. at 468 (emphasis
added). Estelle does not control Leiva’s case because Leiva presented an insanity
defense and introduced psychiatric testimony in support of that defense. The
Estelle Court expressly stated that its holding would be different if the defendant
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had asserted an insanity defense and the government introduced a psychiatric
examination to rebut the defendant’s psychiatric evidence. See id. at 465. In a
later case, the Supreme Court confirmed that if a defendant “presents psychiatric
evidence, then, at the very least, the prosecution may rebut this presentation with
evidence from the reports of the [psychiatric] examination that the defendant
requested” without violating the Fifth Amendment. Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483
U.S. 402, 422-23 (1987). Thus, the California Court of Appeal’s decision was not
contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court
precedent.
AFFIRMED.
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